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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The subject of petrodollar recycling has frequently captured the interest of 
academics, politicians and the media.  Specifically, the issue typically boils down 
to one central question: where exactly are the petrodollars—revenue earned from 
the sale of oil—flowing? According to traditional scholars like Bernard Mommer 
and Terry Lynn Karl the recurring argument is that in oil-exporting nations, oil 
revenues are channeled directly into the hands of a few government officials 
resulting in corruption, inequality and economic decay.   
However, the main limitation of this traditional argument is that it tends to 
focus solely on the dynamics between the national level and local communities.  
With the increasing trends of globalization and financialization, I find the 
traditional viewpoint to be outdated and too narrow in focus.   Hence, I argue that 
when the perspective is expanded from the national to the international an 
intriguing aspect materializes: in reality, the majority of oil revenues are actually 
flowing out of the state and into global financial markets. 
Before I examine how petrodollars reach international financial markets it 
is necessary to review the traditional literature regarding oil-exporting nations.  
Hence, section one assesses the classic tale of oil-exporters and concludes with 
the introduction of a new actor for managing oil revenues: Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (SWFs).  Since they are a relatively unknown concept, section two serves 
as a general introduction to sovereign wealth funds.  Next, section three elaborates 
on the previous discussion by providing an in-depth case study of the main 
Middle Eastern funds while section four examines the impact of these funds on 
international finance.  Lastly, in section five I return to the traditional concept of 
the resource curse and examine how sovereign wealth funds impact their domestic 
economies.   
Over the past ten years, the rise of sovereign wealth funds as major players 
in international finance has generated a wide array of sensationalist perspectives 
and has left the general public with a sense of confusion regarding the true nature 
of sovereign wealth funds.  Thus, my goal is to provide a more realistic and 
pragmatic view of the role of sovereign wealth funds in both their international 
and national space.
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PREFACE 
 
“Between corrupt mortgage brokers, feckless lenders, and risk-happy 
hedge funds, there’s plenty to keep investors and policymakers up at 
night. But recently a new item has appeared on the list of things to worry 
about: so-called sovereign wealth funds, which are investment funds 
controlled by foreign governments.”1 
  
 With headlines reading “The Invasion of the Sovereign Wealth Funds”2 in 
the Economist, “Sovereign Wealth Funds Spark Concerns”3 in the New York 
Times and “US Fears Over Sovereign Wealth Fund Threat ‘Legitimate’”4 in the 
Financial Times, the world was introduced to the next great villain of 
international finance.  Sovereign wealth funds have all the ingredients for disaster: 
in the name of privatization and capitalism it is bad enough that they are the 
investment arms of foreign governments, but of even more concern in a post 9/11 
world is that many of these ‘foreign governments’ belong to Arab, non-
democratic, anti-western countries.  Case closed? Not exactly. 
 Paradoxically, during the same timeframe (between 2007-2009) the exact 
same mainstream news outlets portraying sovereign wealth funds as the enemy 
ran articles entitled: “Superfunds to the Rescue”5 (Economist), “Big Payday for 
Rescuers in the Crisis”6 (New York Times), and “From Vultures to White 
Knights”7 (Financial Times).  Evidentially, the image and role of sovereign 
                                                        
1
 James Surowiecki, "Sovereign Wealth World," The New Yorker (2007). 
2
 The Economist, "The invasion of the sovereign-wealth funds," The Economist (2008). 
3
 Dealbook, "Sovereign Wealth Funds Spark Concerns," The New York Times (2007). 
4
 Stephanie Kirchgaessner, "US Fears Over Sovereign Wealth Fund Threat ‘Legitimate', 
Says Official," The Financial Times (2007). 
5
 The Economist, "Superfunds to the Rescue," The Economist (2007). 
6
 Eric Dash, "Big Paydays for Rescuers in the Crisis," The New York Times (2009). 
7
 The Financial Times, "From Vultures to White Knights," The Financial Times (2009). 
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wealth funds is unclear. Sovereign wealth funds have been cited as signifying 
everything from corruption, fear, and destabilization to globalization, cooperation 
and economic development.  What exactly are these so-called ‘Sovereign Wealth 
Funds’ and more importantly: are they villains or are they heroes?   
 Surprisingly, the media hype surrounding sovereign wealth funds is a 
recent development.  In fact, the term ‘sovereign wealth fund’ itself was only 
coined in 20058.  However, the aforementioned speculations stem from a much 
older debate concerning the flow of petrodollars—the revenue earned from the 
sale of oil.  Specifically, the issue boils down to one central question: where are 
the petrodollars flowing?  According to traditional literature, the recurring 
argument is that in oil-exporting nations, oil revenues are channeled directly into 
the hands of a few government officials resulting in corruption and inequality.  In 
essence, traditional literature portrays oil as curse ultimately resulting in “rich 
countries with poor people.”9  
 However, the main limitation of the traditional literature on oil-exporting 
nations is that it tends to focus solely on the dynamics between the national level 
and local communities.  I argue that when the perspective is expanded from the 
national to the international an intriguing phenomenon materializes: in reality, the 
majority of oil revenues are actually flowing out of the state and into global 
financial markets.   How exactly are these petrodollars reaching international 
                                                        
8
 Andrew Rozanov, "Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?," State Street Global Advisor 
(2005): 1-4. 
9
 Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Making Natural Resources into a Blessing rather than a Curse," 
Covering OIl: A Reporter's Guide to Energy and Development (2005): 19. 
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financial markets?  The answer is none other than the infamous sovereign wealth 
funds.   
 Again, we return to a rather prevalent and important question: what are 
sovereign wealth funds?  Ultimately, this is a question with many answers.  Are 
they extensions of corrupt authoritarian governments looking to maximize 
personal wealth over social welfare?  Are they mechanisms for the Arab world to 
take over key US industries like defense and technology?  Are they simply 
‘rational’ investors, looking to maximize returns on investments? Or are they 
tools for economic development, seeking to eradicate the resource curse once and 
for all?  
In order to discover the true nature of sovereign wealth funds, it is 
necessary to start from the very beginning.  Hence, section one will commence 
with a look at the history of oil-exporting countries during the 20th century and the 
concurrent ascent of sovereign wealth funds.  Section two will then serve as a 
general introduction to the concept of sovereign wealth funds.  Section three will 
elaborate on the previous discussion by providing an in-depth case study of the 
main Middle Eastern funds while section four will examine the impact these funds 
have on international finance.  Lastly, in section five we will return to the 
traditional concept of the resource curse and examine how sovereign wealth funds 
impact their domestic economies.  All in all, it is my hope that by the end of this 
study the reader will walk away with a clearer, more realistic image of sovereign 
wealth funds.  Albeit for better or for worse.    
 
  
1 
SECTION 1 
The Classic Tale of Oil-Exporters 
 
“Control over access to natural resources - and, therefore, to the territories 
where they are located - has been at the origin of countless conflicts, which can 
be traced back to the beginnings of civilization and have continued to exist up to 
the present.”10 
 
The classic story of oil-exporting countries revolves around the underlying 
concept of Sovereignty.   At the most general level, the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648) established that “states have sovereignty over the land and people in their 
territories.”11   More specifically, the sovereignty desired the most by oil-
exporting countries is the acknowledgement of a state-owned natural resource 
(oil) and “the right to grant or deny access to this land.”12  Unfortunately, as most 
traditional literature highlights, the road towards sovereignty has been 
characterized by booms and busts.  To illustrate these ups and downs, prominent 
scholars like Bernard Mommer and Terry Lynn Karl call attention to the different 
phases of oil regimes.13  Furthermore, while the oil-exporting countries’ initial 
struggle and successful emergence from domination experienced during the first 
oil regime is indeed significant, most traditional literature tends to concentrate on 
                                                        
10
 Bernard Mommer, Global Oil and the Nation State (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 1-255. 
11
 “Sovereignty” In, The Dictionary of Human Geography, 5th Edition, Derek Gregory, 
Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J. Watts, and Sarah Whatmore (eds.) 706-707, 
Oxford, UK:  Wiley-Blackwell. 
12
 Mommer 2002, 98. 
13
 Traditional Literature refers mainly, but is not limited to the following works: Bernard 
Mommer, Global Oil and the Nation State (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),  
Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkely: 
University of California Press, 1997), Jeffrey D. Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz Macartan 
Humphreys, Escaping the Resource Curse (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007), Thad Dunning, Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political 
Regimes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
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the height of oil-exporting countries’ sovereignty.  Specifically, traditional 
literature emphasizes the phenomenon known as the resource curse whereby the 
abundant and plentiful oil revenues experienced by oil-exporting countries at the 
height of their sovereignty were initially perceived as a blessing and how these 
same revenues become a curse and ultimately result in “rich countries with poor 
people.”14  While there is abundant evidence supporting a theory of the resource 
curse, traditional literature tends to stop at this dismal conclusion; ultimately 
painting an incomplete, oversimplified picture.  When reexamining what 
traditional literature overlooks, the future potential for oil-exporting nations 
appears to be more optimistic than initially expected.  
 
Initial Struggle for Sovereignty 
 
First Oil Regime: Absolute Minimal Sovereignty  
 
  The first oil regime began early in the 20th century with the initial 
discoveries of oil in the Middle East.   Following the discovery of oil, concessions 
were granted under colonial and imperial control, establishing a period of foreign 
domination over oil-exporting countries.   The first concession was the D’Arcy 
concession in 1901 when Persia was divided up between the British and the 
Russians15.  Subsequently, other countries followed suit and eventually “every 
single concession covered a large part, if not all, of the national territory of these 
countries.”16   Furthermore, it is worth noting that many of these concessions were 
intended to remain in effect for the long run with some lasting between 75-100 
                                                        
14
 Stiglitz 2005, 19. 
15
 Mommer 2002, 118.  
16
 Ibid. 
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years.  With German, British and Dutch interests all competing for concessions, it 
came as no surprise that the United States became interested as well.  By 1928, “a 
U.S. - dominated alliance of British, Dutch, and U.S. oil companies” came 
together to form the International Oil Cartel (AKA the “Majors”) and “controlled 
world oil production and set the world market price.”17   By controlling both 
production and prices, the “Majors” essentially controlled the entire oil industry 
(outside the United States).   As a result, “the absolute dominance of the oil 
companies over the exporting states characterized this regime.”18    
  The main thrust of the control was asserted outside of the US market due 
to the fact that the US market was more competitive thanks to the presence of 
several small independent oil companies.  Furthermore, this increased competition 
in the United States resulted in a higher price of oil due to higher production 
costs.  Hence, the “Majors” selected the price of oil to be in accordance with US 
prices because “oil production was significantly cheaper in all other oil-producing 
nations.”19  This difference between the high price of oil, in accordance with 
higher U.S. costs, and the low cost of production in oil exporting countries 
enabled the Majors to extract a surplus of profits.   
  Good news for the international oil companies, but what about the oil-
exporting countries?   Intrigued by the surplus profits, oil-exporting countries 
sought to increase their share of oil revenues as well.  However, the advent of 
                                                        
17
 Fernando Coronil, The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1997) 53. 
18
 Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkely: 
University of California Press, 1997) 51. 
19
 Coronil 1997, 53. 
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concessions introduced an important concept to oil-exporting countries: “the 
payment to landlords in exchange for access to sub-soil resources.”20   This is 
otherwise known as rent and in the case of oil-exporting countries the state was 
the landlord.  Initially, the Majors came together in the Red Line Agreement of 
1928 and agreed not to compete for concessions in an effort to limit the amount of 
ground rent allotted to landlords.  The original rent or royalty was “set at 4 
shillings per ton of oil and if profits were increasing it could increase to 6 
shillings and 2 shillings if profits fell.”21   The rent was a flat rate (4 shillings per 
ton of oil) and was only allowed to fluctuate, albeit slightly, if the price of oil 
increased or decreased.  Hence, the rent was dependent and determined by price, 
otherwise known as differential rents.22   Thus, oil-exporting countries’ ability to 
increase their oil revenues was sharply limited and dependent upon international 
oil companies’ surplus profits.   
Second Oil Regime: Increase in Bargaining Power 
 
 One of the main reasons why the “Majors” were able to exert so much 
control and dominance over the oil-exporting nations was the prevalence and 
nature of the colonial system.  As Mommer states, “no modern sovereign country 
would ever hand over to a few private companies the control of its natural 
resources.”23  Hence, the decline in colonialism after World War II took a 
significant toll on “the major’s” power and influence.  In addition, “the emergence 
                                                        
20
 “Thad Dunning, Does Oil Promote Democracy?: Regime Change in Rentier States 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 39. 
21 Mommer 2002,120. 
22 Coronil 1997, 53. 
23
 Mommer 2002, 161. 
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of independent oil companies into the world market increased competition and 
thus oil-exporting countries were able to improve their bargaining positions.”24  
With more players entering the market, oil-exporting countries began to compare 
their concessions with their neighbors, in particular the royalties, and started to 
demand a greater share of the oil revenues.  
Evidence of this increase in bargaining power on behalf of the oil-
exporting nations is demonstrated by profit sharing agreements adopted in the 
early 1950s.  After World War II, the price of oil nearly doubled and hence the 
ground rent was expected to rise to the standard upper limit of 6 shillings.  
However, the international oil companies already instituted a generous fifty-fifty 
profit sharing agreement with the government of Venezuela because they deemed 
this to be the ultimate fair compromise for both sides.25  This fifty-fifty profit 
sharing agreement quickly became the gold standard across the Middle East as 
well.  Hence, the international oil companies became aware of the increased 
bargaining power on behalf of the oil-exporters and used the fifty-fifty profit 
sharing agreement as an attempt to appease them. 
 Considering oil prices had been relatively stable throughout this time, the 
price collapse in 1959 was the catalyst for oil-exporting countries to take action.  
Since their rents were dependent and determined by prices, the decrease in prices 
illuminated how little control oil-exporters had over the fate of their own 
resources.  Hence, in 1960 oil-exporting countries formed their own cartel 
otherwise known as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).  
                                                        
24
 Karl 1997, 51. 
25
 Mommer 2002, 125-133. 
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“A cartel of landowners, not producers.”26 Initially, OPEC was established to 
promote price stability, however the desire to increase oil revenues enticed 
members of OPEC to increase prices in order to increase their own revenues.  
Hence, whereas oil-exporting countries’ rent once was determined by price, 
OPEC was now driven to set a price determined by rent.  This form of rent is 
known as an absolute rent because it reflects the power of the landlords in 
determining rent.27  In sum, the creation of OPEC signified “the right of all 
countries to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources.”28   
 
Height of Sovereignty and the Struggle to Retain it 
 
Oil as a Blessing 
 
 The newfound ability and potential for oil-exporting countries to finally 
capitalize and profit from their natural resource endowments generated strong 
sentiments of optimism and hopes for prosperity. Terry Lynn Karl provides the 
best description of the significance of OPEC for oil-exporting nations:  
By seizing the institutional capacity to set prices for oil and by 
nationalizing their domestic production, these countries which 
had been virtual case studies of foreign domination in the past, 
finally appeared to gain control over their primary natural 
resource.29 
 
After a many years of dominance, oil-exporting countries were finally not only 
able to control their own production, but now they were even able to control 
                                                        
26
 Coronil 1997, 54. 
27
 “Rent” In, The Dictionary of Human Geography, 5th Edition, Derek Gregory, Ron 
Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael J. Watts, and Sarah Whatmore (eds.) 644-645, 
Oxford, UK:  Wiley-Blackwell. 
28
 Mommer 2002, 151. 
29
 Karl 1997, 3. 
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prices.  The first major instance of this price control was when OPEC started to 
decisively raise the price of oil between 1970 and 1973 in an attempt to offset the 
devaluation of the US dollar.30  The real tipping point occurred with the start of 
the Yom Kippur war on October 6th 1973.31  In opposition to the US’s support of 
Israel in the war, OPEC decided to exercise its bargaining power and instituted an 
embargo against Israel’s supporters.  Furthermore, OPEC raised the price of crude 
oil 17% to $5.12 per barrel on October 16th and again on December 22nd from 
$5.12 to $11.65 per barrel.32  The Arab Oil Embargo eventually ended in on 
March 18th 1974, however the price increases generated extremely large revenues 
for oil-exporting countries.  In fact, “in the brief period from 1970 to 1974 alone, 
government revenues of OPEC nations leapt eleven fold.”33  
The traditional literature is keen to focus on this “golden period” because 
these revenues were expected to be the drivers of economic development, 
bringing prosperity and wealth to oil exporting countries.  As Karl asserts, “new 
revenues from petroleum would provide the resources necessary to catch up to the 
developed world while simultaneously bringing political stability and a better life 
for the people.”34  However, in reality as Mommer points out, “the economic and 
political performance of the Third World oil-exporting countries after the OPEC 
                                                        
30
 The devaluation of the US dollar occurred in 1971 after the United States discontinued 
the use of the Gold Exchange Standard, allowing the US dollar to float.  Since oil is 
priced in terms of US dollars, oil-exporting nations’ revenues decrease as a result of the 
depreciation. 
31
 Energy Information Administration, "Annual Global Oil Market Chronology," 2007, 1-
51. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Karl 1997, 3. 
34
 Ibid. 
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revolution has been rather poor.”35  This phenomenon is what is widely referred to 
as the resource curse.   
 
Oil as a Curse  
 
 While oil was initially viewed as a blessing for oil-exporting countries, 
Joseph Stiglitz echoes traditional literature when he points out “it appears that, on 
average, resource-rich countries have performed worse than those with smaller 
endowments.”36 Specifically, “countries benefiting from a wealth of natural 
resources have experiences on average a lower economic growth rate than 
resource-poor ones over the past 30 years.”37 What specifically do low levels of 
economic growth entail? To elaborate, instead of economic growth and prosperity 
Karl describes that oil-exporting countries have experienced the following 
ailments: 
Poor economic diversification, dismal social welfare 
indicators, high levels of poverty and inequality, 
devastating environmental impacts, rampant 
corruption, exceptionally poor governance, and high 
incidences of conflict and war.38 
    
Why have oil-exporting countries been unable to translate their massive 
amount of revenues into sustained increases in economic growth and prosperity?  
One commonly cited culprit is the so-called “Dutch Disease” whereby non-oil 
exports become non-competitive thanks to the oil sector driving up the exchange 
rate of the local currency.39 The model developed by W. Max Corden and J. Peter 
                                                        
35
 Mommer 2002, 233. 
36
 Stiglitz 2005, 13. 
37
 Philippe Le Billon, "The Resource Curse", Adelphi Papers 45.373 (2005): 11-27. 
38
 Karl 2005, 22. 
39 Ibid. 
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Neary in 1982 assumes two sectors in an economy: the tradable sector (natural 
resources, agriculture and manufacturing) and the non-tradable sector (services).40 
When the price of a natural resource significantly increases, it impacts the 
economy in two ways.  The first is the “spending effect” whereby the additional 
revenue causes an increase in the demand and price of non-tradable goods over 
tradable agriculture and manufactured goods (lagging sector).  However, since the 
prices of tradable goods are set internationally, they remain unchanged.  This 
results in a decrease in exports of the ‘lagging’ sector and an increase in imports 
to meet the rising demand.   
The second effect is the “resource movement effect”, whereby the 
resource boom causes a shift in labor and capital towards the natural resource 
sector away from other sectors of the domestic economy.  As a result, “Output 
declines in the non-resource economy, but by more in tradables, where prices are 
fixed at world market levels.”41 The combined result of both effects is the decline 
in output of the lagging export sector (manufacturing and agriculture) and the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate—increase in the price of non-tradable 
goods compared to tradable goods.42  Ultimately, Dutch Disease is one 
explanation why oil-exporting countries’ lack economic diversification.   
Another popular reason for oil-exporting countries’ demise is the incentive 
for rent-seeking behavior.  In “rentier states”, where the primary source of 
                                                        
40
 Otaviano Canuto, Ekaterina Vostroknutova, Milan Brahmbhatt, "Dealing with Dutch 
Disease," Economic Premise 16 (2010): 1-7. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid. 
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government revenue accrues from natural resource rents, the government is 
completely dependent on the rents rather than on the taxation of its citizens.  “The 
massive flow of natural resource revenues into the fiscal coffers of the state 
engendered perverse political as well as economic effects…fostered corruption, 
weakened accountability and heightened incentives for rent-seeking.”43 Therefore, 
the very presence of rents along with oil-exporting countries’ desire to increase 
such rents creates a viscous circle with the wealth ending up in the hands of a few 
(government) while the rest of the population is left out.  Ultimately, resulting in 
‘rich countries with poor people’. 
 
Painting a Clearer Picture 
 
What Traditional Literature Overlooks 
 
 To better understand the limitations of traditional literature on oil-
exporting countries, we begin by identifying the primary focus of the majority of 
literature.  For starters, they all correctly identify the shift in bargaining power 
over the 20th century from the Majors, ultimately to the oil-exporting nations.  
Next, traditional analysis heavily focuses on the height of the oil-exporting 
countries’ sovereignty when the abundant and plentiful oil revenues were 
perceived as a blessing and how these same revenues became a curse and 
ultimately led to the downfall of many oil-exporting nations.  What is most 
interesting and prominent is how traditional literature is quick to put the blame on 
political institutions and governmental policies as the reason why oil revenues 
often turn into a curse.  Karl is the main advocate of this sentiment and states:  
                                                        
43
 Dunning 2008, xv. 
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That the petro-state depends on revenues generated by a 
depletable commodity, that this commodity produces 
extraordinary rents, and that these rents are funneled 
through weak institutions virtually ensure that the public 
sector will lack the authority and corporate cohesiveness 
necessary to exercise effective capacity.44  
 
Hence, traditional literature on oil-exporting countries tends to concentrate on 
the fact that the revenues are channeled into the hands of the few elite, resulting 
in corruption and inequality.  
 However, traditional literature fails to ask the most fundamental 
questions of all: if the money is not being channeled back into the state and 
reaching the citizens, then where exactly is it going?  Whereas traditional 
literature tends to focus solely on the dynamics between the national level and 
local communities, the answer to this key question requires a shift from a 
national-scale to a global perspective.  Indeed, in this age of increasing 
globalization the majority of this money is flowing out of the state into the 
global financial markets.  
 
Shift in Perspective 
 
 The widespread increase in globalization and financialization around the 
world highlights the emerging importance and influence of international markets 
rather than governments.   Out of the traditional literature, Bernard Mommer is 
the only one to highlight this important shift.  His analysis embodies this trend by 
asserting that consuming countries and exporting nations interact and compete for 
power via the international financial markets.45  As a result, Mommer claims that 
                                                        
44
 Karl 2005, 58. 
45
 Mommer 2002, 232. 
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we have entered a new phase where the sovereignty of oil exporting countries is 
being threatened and gradually taken away by consuming nations’ dominance of 
the global financial markets.   
 Traditional literature on oil-exporting countries paints a rather dismal 
picture of oil-exporting countries’ pasts and eminent futures.   While Mommer’s 
argument is a step in the right direction by acknowledging an international scope, 
he paints the same dismal picture as other traditionalists by overlooking the ways 
in which exporting countries can link to international markets and to consuming 
countries and thus retain bargaining power.  Most importantly, he underestimates 
the potential wealth and strategic use of oil-exporting countries’ revenues.  Hence, 
Mommer makes the same detrimental mistake as other traditional literature by not 
exploring the actual flow of these petrodollars.  
When the increasing role of global markets and financialization is taken 
into account it does not come as a surprise that a significant proportion of oil 
revenues is channeled out of the oil-exporting country and into global financial 
markets.   In sum, Mommer and traditional literature overlook oil-exporting 
countries’ potential to be taken seriously as independent sovereign players in the 
global financial arena.  In fact, if traditional literature expanded their perspective 
to include international financial markets they would find that in reality, many oil-
exporting countries have already started to use their wealth to their advantage and 
have successfully secured themselves a seat at the table with other major players 
in international finance.   
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SECTION 2 
Introduction to Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 
“Paradoxically, despite the prospects of wealth and opportunity that accompany 
the discovery and extraction of oil and other natural resources, such endowments 
all too often impede rather than further balanced and sustainable 
development.”46 
 
 When viewed only in terms of a domestic perspective, the history and 
future prospects of oil-exporting countries appears to be extremely bleak.   
However, once the perspective shifts from a local level to an international scale 
the picture looks drastically different.   Although the players are the same as in 
traditional literature (Oil Exporters vs. Consuming Nations), the advent of 
globalization and financialization has created a new environment for them to 
compete: international financial markets.  “By definition, economic and financial 
globalization—in particular the expansion of trade—necessitates that 
governments cede some portion of their domestic autonomy to the global 
marketplace.”47  Furthermore, globalization and financialization has opened up 
flows of capital, ideas, technology and people via access to international markets. 
Is this just a case of the same story, but different setting? According to Bernard 
Mommer it is because the exporting nations are once again losing the battle for 
power due to consuming nations’ dominance of the global markets.    However, 
after a closer look at the breakdown of assets in the international financial 
                                                        
46
 Jeffrey D. Sachs, Joseph E. Stiglitz Macartan Humphreys, Escaping the Resource 
Curse (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007) 1. 
47
 Adam D. Dixon & Ashby H. B. Monk, "Rethinking the Sovereign in Sovereign Wealth 
Funds," 3 August 2010. <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1652701>. Last Accessed: 25 April 
2011.  
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markets, it may be the consuming countries’ hegemony that is now being 
threatened.  After all, with billions of dollars in oil revenues it was only a matter 
of time before oil-exporting countries realized their own potential to compete with 
other major financial players.    
 How exactly are oil-exporting countries competing with other financial 
giants?  The answer lies in the creation of an entirely new set of financial actors: 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs).   SWFs are a missing piece to the traditional 
puzzle of ‘rich countries with poor people’.  They are the primary vehicles for 
petrodollar recycling and allow exporting countries to successfully link to 
international markets and to consuming countries.  SWFs finally allow oil-
exporting countries to regain a sense of sovereignty by not only controlling their 
own wealth, but also using it to their advantage.  In conclusion, Sovereign Wealth 
Funds and the countries they represent should be taken seriously as independent 
sovereign players in the global financial arena.   
 This section will thus serve as an introduction to Sovereign Wealth Funds.  
Given that SWFs are a relatively obscure concept, it is necessary to begin with a 
brief overview of SWF basics.   As it turns out, SWFs are a rather heterogeneous 
group so while it is worthwhile to mention the different types of SWFs, the 
remainder of the study will only concentrate on the Sovereign Wealth Funds 
located in oil-exporting nations.  The next part of this section will examine the 
emergence and evolution of Middle Eastern SWFs as major players in 
international finance.   
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Sovereign Wealth Fund Basics 
 
The Term Itself: 
 Since it is a relatively obscure concept in general, Sovereign Wealth Funds 
require a brief introduction.  In fact, one reason why SWFs are a reasonably 
unknown topic is because the term sovereign wealth fund did not even exist until 
2005 when Andrew Rozanov of State Street Global Advisors coined the 
expression in an article entitled: Who Holds the Wealth of Nations.48 Another 
contributing factor to their ambiguity is that there is no real agreed upon 
definition.  However, if forced to hone in on a single definition the one listed in 
the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices of the International Working 
Group of SWFs is the most official and concise definition.  As stated: 
“SWFs are defined as special purpose investment funds or 
arrangements, owned by the general government. Created by 
the general government for macroeconomic purposes, SWFs 
hold, manage, or administer assets to achieve financial 
objectives, and employ a set of investment strategies, which 
include investing in foreign financial assets. The SWFs are 
commonly established out of balance of payments surpluses, 
official foreign currency operations, the proceeds of 
privatizations, fiscal surpluses, and/or receipts resulting from 
commodity exports.”49  
 
To further clarify the above definition, the words in bold signify key defining 
features of sovereign wealth funds.  In sum, sovereign wealth funds are the 
investment arms of governments charged with the responsibility of recycling 
wealth from commodity revenues or balance of payment surpluses by investing in 
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 Andrew Rozanov, "Who Holds the Wealth of Nations?," State Street Global Advisor 
(2005): 1-4. 
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 International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds, "Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
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foreign financial assets.  The asset classes range from equities (stocks), fixed-
income (bonds), real estate and alternatives (derivatives & hedge funds).50 
Financial Resources: 
 Not all sovereign wealth funds are the same.  In fact, it is a rather 
heterogeneous category.   For simplification purposes, SWFs are typically 
classified by the following two characteristics:  how the funds are financed and 
the function of the fund.  The primary form of SWF taxonomy is according to 
where their funding comes from.  In terms of financial resources, SWFs can be 
categorized into either a commodity fund or a non-commodity fund.    
  A sovereign wealth fund is a commodity fund if it receives its “financial 
resources from the export of raw materials owned by the state or from 
taxes/royalties related to their sale.”51  It does not come as a surprise that the most 
common form of commodity SWFs receive their financing from petroleum 
revenues.   Thus, the majority of these funds are located in the Middle East, 
specifically in the same oil-exporting nations perceived to be doomed by the 
resource curse.  Furthermore, commodity funds constitute the majority of SWFs 
at nearly 60%.52  While the remainder of this study will be focused on this type of 
                                                        
50
 Stock: ownership of a corporation represented by shares that signify a part of the 
corporation’s assets and earnings.  Bonds: Interest-bearing securities issued primarily by 
governments and companies and are regarded as a low-risk investment.  Derivative: a 
financial security, like options and futures, whose value is derived in part from the value 
and characteristics of another underlying asset. Hedge Funds: aim to maximize their 
returns on investments by employing a range of risky techniques like speculation and 
hedging. Source: Harvey, Campbell R. "Stock." "Bond." "Derivative." "Hedge 
Fund." Forbes Financial Glossary. Forbes.com. Web. 
<http://www.forbes.com/tools/glossary/index.jhtml.> Last Accessed: 21 Apr. 2011. 
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SWF it is worthwhile to mention the other type and all of the possible functions to 
gain a thorough understanding of the subject.   
 The other major genre of SWFs is the non-commodity funds, which 
receive their financial resources from “non-energy current account and other 
balance-of-payments surpluses53 accumulated, as well as privatization revenues 
and other fiscal proceeds.”54 This type of SWFs is most prevalent in the East 
Asian countries that experienced rapid economic growth and massive balance of 
trade surpluses from exporting manufactured goods.  These countries set up such 
funds as a way to manage their newfound wealth.   
Multiple Functions: 
 Sovereign wealth funds can provide a wide variety of functions.   After 
looking at a funds’ financing the next step is to look at the function of the specific 
fund.  To simplify, the International Monetary Fund categorizes SWFs according 
to five different purposes.    
 
 
 
 
                                                        
53
 When more money is flowing into a country from abroad than is going out of a country 
during the same time period.  Source: "Balance of Payments." Economic Terms A-Z. The 
Economist Newspaper Limited. Web. 
<http://www.economist.com/research/economics/alphabetic.cfm?letter=B#balanceofpay
ments>. Last Accessed:  21 Apr. 2011.  
54
 Curzio & Miceli 2010, 24. 
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The following table summarizes each function: 
Stabilization 
Funds 
Savings 
Funds 
Reserve 
Investment 
Corporations 
Development 
Funds 
Pension 
Reserve Funds 
 
Stabilize and 
insulate fiscal 
policies from 
fluctuations in 
the prices of 
raw materials 
 
 
 
 
Convert non-
renewable 
resources into 
financial 
wealth for the 
benefit of 
future 
generations 
 
These assets are 
counted as 
official 
reserves, but 
are managed 
separately and 
more 
aggressively 
 
Finance socio-
economic 
development 
projects 
 
Use sources 
other than 
normal pension 
schemes in 
order to ease 
pension 
indebtedness 
Adapted from: Alberto Quadrio Curzio & Valeria Miceli, Sovereign Wealth Funds: A Complete 
Guide to State-Owned Investment Funds (Harriman House LTD, 2010) 25.  
 
It is important to note that both commodity and non-commodity sovereign 
wealth funds can and often utilize a combination of the aforementioned motives.   
In general, commodity SWFs tend to exhibit stabilization & savings functions 
while non-commodity SWFs tend to be more aligned with reserve investment 
corporations.  Lastly, development and pension reserve funds have been observed 
in both commodity and non-commodity funds.  This study will elaborate further 
on the stabilization and saving functions in the next section and discuss 
development funds in the final section.   
When looking at the wide variety of definitions, functions and 
classifications of sovereign wealth funds it is obvious that their heterogeneity is a 
large contributor to their ambiguity.   For the purpose of looking at the evolution 
of oil-exporting nations in the Middle East, the most relevant type of sovereign 
wealth funds are commodity funds.   Thus, the following section will elaborate of 
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the evolution of such funds and how they fit into and extend the oil-exporting 
nations’ battle for sovereignty. 
Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Middle East 
 
  
Now that the concept of sovereign wealth funds has been introduced, it is 
time to return to the evolution of oil-exporting nations in the Middle East, insert 
sovereign wealth funds into the equation and observe the effects on their struggle 
for sovereignty.  More specifically, will the addition of sovereign wealth funds 
project the same dismal outcome as depicted in traditional literature or will it 
reveal a more optimistic reality?  
Emerging from the Shadows: 1953 - 2002 
 The creation of the Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA) in 1953 can be 
viewed as the origins of the concept of sovereign wealth funds even though the 
official terminology was not coined for another fifty-three years.  KIA was 
established in order to “invest surpluses derived from oil revenues so as to reduce 
Kuwait’s dependence on exhaustible fossil reserves, thus lessening the effects of 
price oscillation.”55  This quote captures the essence of oil-based sovereign wealth 
funds.  Sovereign wealth funds gave oil-exporting nations a way to convert 
revenues from a non-renewable source (oil) into renewable financial assets 
(primarily low risk assets like treasury bonds).  
 Another way to look at the rise of Middle East-based sovereign wealth 
funds is by looking at the strong correlation between the rise in the price of oil 
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and the number of funds established.56  The first significant price increase was 
between the 1970s and 1980s when the price increased from less than $5 a barrel 
to more than $35.57   This is referred to as the golden years, as previously 
mentioned, when oil-exporting countries experienced a rapid accumulation of 
wealth and literally had more money than they knew what to do with.  Initially, 
OPEC countries “expanded domestic spending by about 50% a year between 
1974 and 1979, enriching the elite, but spawned white-elephant projects and 
fuelled inflation of more than 15% a year.”58 As previously mentioned, since the 
price of oil is set in terms of US dollars, oil-exporting countries accumulated 
massive reserves of US dollars while the purchasing power of the domestic 
currency was eroded.   
However, when observed more closely some countries started to reverse 
this inflationary trend by accumulating foreign assets signaling evidence of 
foreign direct investment.  “Revenues were partially spent domestically, with the 
resulting push of domestic inflation.  Consequently oil revenues were increasingly 
allocated to foreign direct investment.”59 In short, by focusing only on the 
domestic picture, the traditional literature fails to see the increasing proportion of 
oil revenues that were actually flowing outside the country.   By creating a vehicle 
to manage foreign direct investment (SWFs), rentier states found a way seek 
insulation from price volatility by diversifying their economies away from oil.   
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 A graph of the history of world oil prices along with a list of the specific SWFs 
established can be found in the appendix. 
57
 Curzio & Miceli 2010, 5. 
58
 The Economist, "The Devil's Excrement: is oil wealth a blessing or a curse?," The 
Economist (2003). 
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 Curzio & Miceli 2010, 6. 
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The time to test the ability of sovereign wealth funds to help protect oil-
exporting nations from oil price volatility came with the price collapse in the 
1980s when the price of oil fell to below $20 a barrel.  Following the oil booms of 
1973 and 1979 the high price of oil led to a reduction in demand and ultimately 
overproduction.  At first, OPEC tried cutting production in order to maintain the 
high prices.  Ultimately, they were unable to maintain the high price of oil and in 
1986 world oil prices fell over 50%.60  “These downward price fluctuations 
reinforced the belief of governments running SWFs that their income should not 
depend solely on oil and natural gas.”61
   
Hence, more countries started creating 
SWFs in order to provide stabilization during price fluctuations.    
During the first phase in the rise of sovereign wealth funds, SWFs got off 
to a slow start.  Between 1953 and 2002, only 27 funds were established.62  
Before they emerged as financial giants, they were extremely passive and 
conservative in their investment strategies.  For instance, their portfolios were 
comprised entirely of low-risk (and thus low-yield) US government securities.   
Thus, their low-profile persona during this first period kept them hidden in the 
shadows.  
However, the increasing globalization in the 1990s further facilitated and 
encouraged investment in the international financial markets.  “The globalization 
of the world economy has made it dramatically easier for investors around the 
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 Curzio & Miceli 2010, 6. 
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world to get in the game.”63  During the next phase in the rise of Middle Eastern 
SWFs, this is exactly what they did: get in the game.   Between 1998 and 2004 
twelve more sovereign wealth funds were established.   Considering the surge in 
the price of oil from less than $20 at the end of 1998 to $40 a barrel in 2004 and 
total assets held by SWFs estimated at $895 billion by 2004, it comes as no 
surprise that sovereign wealth funds started to gain attention.64   
In the Spotlight: 2005 - 2009 
Once again, because of an increase in the price of oil from $60 a barrel in 
2005 to $147 in 2008 the value of SWFs’ assets multiplied.65  Furthermore, 19 
more SWFs were established during just these four years.  Although the number 
of sovereign wealth funds and the value of their assets increased exponentially, 
their behavior remained relatively the same until 2005.  Up until this point in 
time, SWFs “tended to invest very conservatively, tended to invest close to home, 
and tended to invest in emerging economies.”66  The year 2005 marks two 
significant changes in the investment patterns of SWFs, namely in the recipients 
of their investments and the size of their transactions. 
As previously mentioned, all SWFs tended to invest close to home, 
particularly in Asia.  “In dollars, from 1994 to 2004, SWFs invested just under 
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US$15 billion in Asia and less than US$1 billion elsewhere.”67  However, after 
2005 SWFs shifted their investment strategies and found more opportunities to 
invest their massive amounts of wealth in the United States and Europe.  “In 
2008, only US$3.5 billion was destined for Asia, US$11 billion to the EU, US$30 
billion to the United States and US$1.5 billion to other countries.”68  The 
increased emphasis on investing in Western nations took SWFs from the shadows 
to front and center on the world stage.   
In addition to turning their attention to the Western hemisphere, sovereign 
wealth funds specifically took a keen interest in the financial sector.  At first, 
western institutions were hesitant to receive investments from SWFs due to their 
relatively unknown nature and fear of a foreign entity controlling domestic 
institutions.  As noted in the Economist, “In principle everyone welcomes foreign 
investment. But when the money belongs to other governments, people—
especially politicians—are not always so sure.”69 However, with the onset and 
height of the financial crisis in 2007-2008, attitudes from the West towards SWFs 
drastically changed most likely out of desperation.  As Richard Goldberg 
highlights, “meaningful pools of liquidity are out there in the form of petrodollars 
and sovereign wealth funds.”70  With the West suffering from a liquidity71 
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drought and SWFs swimming in an endless sea of money the solution seemed 
obvious.   As a result, “from ‘barbarians’ they became lenders of last resort for the 
shaky financial sector.”72   
The numerous high profile deals between SWFs and major Western 
financial institutions signifies the successful evolution of SWFs from relatively 
unknown entities to major players in the world of international finance.   More 
important, after years of struggling to emerge from the shadow and dominance of 
the West, the rise of sovereign wealth funds as major financial players has given 
oil-exporting nations a new found sense of sovereignty and bargaining power.  
Due to the heterogeneous nature of SWFs, it is necessary to further narrow our 
focus in order to better assess the role of oil-exporting sovereign wealth funds.  
Hence, the next section will take a closer look at the three most prominent SWFs 
in the Middle East in terms of their participation in global financial markets.    
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SECTION 3 
The Major Players in International Financial Markets 
 
“Around 45% of SWFs came from oil rich countries at the end of 2007.  This is a 
clear indication of the magnitude and the financial power of the GCC (Gulf 
Corporation council) originated SWF.  Despite the relatively smaller GDPs and 
economies compared to the industrialized nations, GCC has an extensive 
financial power.”73  
 
 
 On May 25th 1981, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
United Arab Emirates came together to form the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC) 
in order to foster cooperation and unity among Member States.74 Between 2004-
2007, the countries constituting the GCC collectively invested approximately 
$140 billion overseas.75   To put this number into perspective, it is estimated that 
GCC originated SWFs have assets ranging between US$980 billion and 
US$1,478 billion.76 These impressive numbers, coupled with the numerous high 
profile investments in Western financial institutions, signified the transition of 
Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds from relatively unknown entities to 
frontrunners in the global financial markets.     
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 While GCC sovereign wealth funds were extremely active and successful 
in 2007, they started to suffer along with the rest of the financial world with the 
onset of the financial crisis at the end of the year.   “GCC countries suffered 
during the 2007-2009 crisis because of the fall in the price of oil, the tightening of 
international credit conditions, the collapse of the real estate market and the 
increased vulnerability of domestic banks.”77 Just as the failure of many US 
financial institutions during the financial crisis spurred debate and harsh critique 
of the banking industry, the losses incurred by GCC SWFs hurled them into a 
very similar situation.    
 This section will present a more in-depth look at the main GCC sovereign 
wealth funds and their participation in global financial markets.   While the 
previous section served as a brief introduction to SWFs, in order to asses the 
potential impact of the funds on global financial markets three of the key GCC 
SWFs will be examined in detail.   The three key GCC sovereign wealth funds we 
will look at are: The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA - the oldest SWF), The 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA - the largest SWFs), and The Qatar 
Investment Authority (QIA - the new comer).   The next part of this section will 
look at both sides of the debate concerning SWFs’ role and impact on global 
financial markets as well as the funds’ response.   
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Case Studies of the Main Middle Eastern SWFs 
  
 The following case study will provide a more detailed picture of the inner 
workings of the three main GCC sovereign wealth funds targeting international 
markets.   For each of the three funds the following aspects will be taken under 
consideration: history of the fund, mission statement & objectives, investment 
strategy & portfolio characteristics, and high profile transactions.    
Kuwait Investment Authority: The Oldest SWF 
History 
Kuwait was the first country to realize the importance of transforming oil 
wealth from a depleting asset into renewable financial assets.  In 1953 the Kuwait 
Investment Board was created to fulfill this goal.   Although the actual SWF, the 
Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), was not created until 1982, the investment 
board managed the assets of Kuwait in the same fashion as a sovereign wealth 
fund.  Hence, this is why KIA is considered the oldest sovereign wealth fund.78   
Today, KIA is comprised of two main funds: the General Reserve Fund 
(GRF) and the Future Generations Fund (FGF).79  While the General Reserve 
Fund is the recipient of state oil revenues, the Fund for Future Generations is only 
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to be touched in the event of a state emergency.  “The government invests 10% of 
all state revenues, including 10% of the income earned by the General Reserve 
Fund, every year into the Fund for Future Generations.”80   Overall, KIA acts as 
an asset manager and the funds belong to the state.  The estimated value of KIA’s 
assets under management is US$295 billion.81 
Mission 
 KIA’s mission as stated by managing director, Mr. Bader M. Al Sa’ad, is 
“to achieve a long term investment return on the financial reserves entrusted by 
the State of Kuwait to the Kuwait Investment Authority by providing an 
alternative to oil reserves, which would enable Kuwait’s future generations to face 
the uncertainties ahead with greater confidence.” 82  
Investment Strategy 
 KIA has historically been a very conservative investor, preferring low risk 
US debt securities—Treasury bills, notes and bonds—to all other asset classes.  
The fund’s investment strategy remained mostly unchanged until 2004 when 
Bader al Sa’ad took over as managing director.   He discovered many 
comparisons between KIA and Ivy League endowment funds, mainly that they 
both had long-term horizons and conservative methods except that the latter was 
experiencing higher rate of returns. The difference was that the endowment funds 
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were investing in real estate, private equity83, hedge funds and emerging markets 
while KIA was not.84  Hence, KIA increased its portfolio allocations in equities, 
“alternative instruments (private equity, hedge funds and derivatives) and its 
exposure to emerging markets, at the same time reducing US debt securities.”85  
KIA’s current portfolio allocation is 55-65% equities, 8-12% bonds, 8-12% real 
estate and alternative assets and cash at 3-7%.86 
 KIA also pursues a strategy of diversifying investments geographically.  It 
is estimated that KIA aims to invest 76-86% equally between the United States 
and Europe, 13-17% in Asia and Japan and 4-6% in emerging markets.87 
Furthermore, about 50% of its investments are managed by external fund 
managers in order to remain passive investors and avoid taking too large of a 
controlling stake in a company.88  Another aspect supporting their passive 
approach to investing is that they are not allowed to use leverage - the practice of 
borrowing money to raise additional capital.89 
High Profile Transactions 
  Evidence of the strength and resiliency of KIA is exemplified by two of 
its most prominent assets: British Petroleum and Daimler AG, the German car 
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manufacturer.  KIA’s 7.1% stake in Daimler AG dates back to 1969 and even 
when the company suffered losses due to the failed acquisition of Chrysler in 
1998, KIA maintained its stake in the company.90  Furthermore, in response to the 
British Prime Minister at the time, Margaret Thatcher’s call for privatization in 
the late 1980s, KIA increased its stake in BP to 22%.91  However, this sparked 
great concern regarding KIA’s motives and although KIA asserted that it would 
not to play a controlling role in BP it agreed to reduce its stake to 3.3%.  KIA’s 
investment in Daimler AG demonstrates its ability to maintain long-term 
investments and its willingness to appease political pressures is evident in the case 
of BP. 
Now we turn to some of KIA’s more recent investments.  As two of the 
largest US financial institutions, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch, were rapidly being 
engulfed by the financial crisis, they desperately sought liquidity injections to stay 
afloat.  Where did they turn?  They went to sovereign wealth funds like the 
Kuwait Investment Authority.  In January 2008, KIA invested nearly $3 billion in 
Citigroup and $2 billion into Merrill Lynch prior to Merrill’s takeover by Bank of 
America.92 KIA was expected to wait for its preferred shares93 to convert94 into 
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common stock in accordance with their long-term passive strategy.  However, in 
December of 2009, less than two years after the deal was brokered, KIA decided 
to sell its stake in Citigroup for about $4.1 billion, resulting in a profit of $1.1 
billion.95  Along with the profit came attention from the media, politicians and 
market experts.   
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority: The Largest SWF 
 
History 
After the rise in oil prices in 1970s, in 1976 Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al 
Nahyan replaced a part of Abu Dhabi’s department of finance known as the 
Financial Investments Board with the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), 
in an effort to preserve the future wealth of Abu Dhabi.  Seeing as the fund is an 
oil-based commodity fund, it receives its financial resources from dividends 
transferred by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) into the fund: 
70% of any budget surplus.    
The value of the fund’s assets has been estimated to be between US$282 
billion and US$627 billion.96  As is the case with most sovereign wealth funds, it 
is difficult to give an exact estimate of the fund’s assets because the fund does not 
disclose this information to the public.   However, ADIA took a step towards 
greater transparency last year when they published their first ever-annual review.  
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Although it does not contain the overall size of its holdings or specific balance 
sheet details, it does provide helpful insight in terms of their general investment 
strategy. 
Mission 
 As stated in ADIA’s 2009 annual review, “The Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority is a globally-diversified investment institution whose sole mission is to 
invest funds on behalf of the Government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi to make 
available the necessary financial resources to secure and maintain the future 
welfare of the Emirate.”97 
Investment Strategy 
ADIA carries out this mission by maintaining a diversified portfolio across 
geographies, sectors and asset classes including public listed equities, fixed 
income, real estate, and private equity.  As stated in their 2009 annual review, 
“ADIA’s investment strategy involves looking beyond individual economic 
cycles and focusing on strategies aimed at capturing secular trends and 
outperforming the market over the long term.”98 Furthermore, ADIA’s decisions 
are based purely on its economic objectives of delivering sustained long-term 
financial returns and ADIA does not seek active management of the companies it 
invests in.99 
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ADIA’s mission and general investment strategy as stated above has 
remained relatively unchanged for over thirty years and has greatly attributed to 
its success and reputation as the largest and most renowned sovereign wealth fund 
in the world.   When ADIA was first established in 1976, it was primarily focused 
on equities and bonds, treasury, finance and administration, real estate and local 
and regional investments.100  Up until the early 1990s the fund’s investment 
strategy was vigilant and conservative meaning that they invested primarily in 
low-risk liquid assets like treasury bills and avoided high profile investments.    
Eager to seek out higher returns, ADIA started to pursue a more 
aggressive approach by diversifying across asset classes.  As a result, by 2000 
ADIA aimed for a portfolio of: stocks in developed markets (45-55%); stocks in 
emerging markets (8-12%); small-cap stocks101 (1-4%); government bonds (12-
18%); corporate and other bonds (4-8%); Alternative investments (5-10%); real 
estate (5-10%); private equity (2-8%); infrastructure (0-4%); and cash (0-5%).102  
Furthermore, ADIA also continued to diversify the geographic distribution of 
their investments: 35-50% in North America, 25-35% in Europe, 15-25% in 
emerging markets and 10-20% in developed Asia.103  
 
 
                                                        
100
 Ibid. 
101
 Refers to stocks with a relatively small market capitalization.  The exact definition can 
vary, but generally it is a company with a market capitalization of between $300 million 
and $2 billion. Source: "Small-Cap." Investopedia Dictionary. Investopedia. Web. 
<http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/small-cap.asp>. Last Accessed: 21 Apr. 2011. 
102
 Rawi Abdelal, "Sovereign Wealth in Abu Dhabi," Geopolitics 14.2 (2009): 317-327. 
103
 Bortolotti, Fotak, Miracky, Barbary 2010, 29. 
  
34
High Profile Transactions 
Even with a more diverse portfolio, ADIA’s low profile investment 
strategy remained under the radar until November 2007 when ADIA emerged to 
the public by purchasing 4.9% of Citigroup, the failing Wall Street Bank, for an 
estimated $7.5 billion.  As one of the largest deals ever pursued by a sovereign 
wealth fund, this can be considered the catalyst that catapulted SWFs into the 
spotlight.  The deal specified that sometime between March 2010 and September 
2010 ADIA would convert its shares into common stock at a price between 
$31.83 and $37.24 with an annual coupon104 of 11%.105   However, not 
everything went according to plan and Citigroup stock plummeted to a low of 
3.41 per share.  Unlike KIA, ADIA did not have the option to convert from 
preferred to common stock at any time it pleases to cut its losses.  Hence, ADIA is 
now looking at up to a $4.8 billion paper loss106 when it is forced to convert to 
shares at a price almost 10 times higher than its current value.  Although KIA 
ended up with a profitable deal with Citigroup, this potential loss has also hurled 
ADIA into the spotlight right next to KIA. 
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Qatar Investment Authority: The New Comer 
 
History 
 Out of the three major funds discussed, the Qatar Investment Authority is 
the most recent addition to the group of GCC sovereign wealth funds.  QIA was 
founded by the Qatari Government in 2005 and headed by the country’s prime 
minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim as-Thani.   “Qatar has huge gas reserves  as 
much as one third of the world’s total gas reserves lies within its territory.”107   
The Prime Minister recognized the nation’s rapid accumulation of wealth and 
made it a priority to preserve these funds for future generations.  The fund is 
currently estimated to manage US$70 billion dollars,108 which may appear small 
in comparison to KIA and ADIA, however QIA is making up for lost time with a 
series of high profile investments.  
Mission 
QIA’s mission, as defined on the company website, is to “secure the future 
prosperity of its people by building up a diversified asset base to complement its 
wealth of natural resources.”109 With one of its main goals being economic 
diversification, the fund is looking to further develop the country’s infrastructure, 
education and health facilities.   This strong emphasis on economic diversification 
makes QIA stand out a bit from more traditional SWFs like ADIA and KIA and 
has led to a slightly different investment strategy as well. 
                                                        
107
 Qatar Investment Authority, Economic Backdrop of Qatar, 
<http://www.qia.qa/QIA/about.html#history>. Last Accessed: 25 Apr. 2011. 
108
 Bortolotti, Fotak, Miracky, Barbary 2010, 29. 
109
 Qatar Investment Authority, Mission , <http://www.qia.qa/QIA/about.html#Mission>. 
Last Accessed: 25 Apr. 2011. 
  
36
Investment Strategy 
 QIA’s general investment strategy is similar to that of KIA’s and ADIA’s 
in that it also carries out its mission by building a strong global portfolio 
diversified across asset classes and geographies.  “Although the QIA was formed 
as recently as 2005, it has already built up a strong track record of diversified 
investments, ranging from listed securities, property, alternative assets and private 
equity as well as local strategic sectors.”110 Although exact percentage breakdown 
of QIA’s portfolio is not available to the public, the fund mainly invests in 
equities, fixed income, private equity and direct investment in order to diversify 
its oil and natural gas wealth.  Falling in line with KIA and ADIA, QIA invests all 
around the world with investments in The United States, Europe and Asia.  
Finally, QIA is also driven by strict commercial and financial motives in order to 
secure its reputation as a world-class financial investor.   
High Profile Transactions 
 While KIA and ADIA started off as extremely passive and conservative 
investors and gradually expanded their appetite for risk, QIA came out of the gate 
in full force.  It has gained significant attention in such a short time span by 
pursuing several high profile deals simultaneously.  The first mega deal that 
brought QIA into the spotlight came only two years after their creation with the 
purchase of a 20% stake in the London Stock Exchange for US$2 billion dollars 
in September 2007.  
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A statement from QIA states: 
This is a key investment for Qatar Holding and QIA, and 
one that it intends to hold for the long term. The QIA 
group sees itself as a shareholder that will provide stability 
and support for the Board’s strategy of developing further 
its business and thereby reinforce the City of London’s 
position as the world’s top global capital market.111     
 
The next flashy deal came in 2008 when Barclays, a British bank suffering 
from losses, decided to seek new funds by issuing $8.9 billion of new shares.  
QIA purchased the new shares along with other institutional investors.  In a 
similar fashion to KIA, QIA later decided to sell a $2.1 billion stake in the British 
bank and come out with a profit around $985 million.112  Ironically, QIA made a 
quick turn around with this profit and channeled it into a US$3.7 billion 
investment in the British supermarket chain, Sainsbury.  With so many high 
profile deals on the table, it is evident that QIA is pursuing a more aggressive 
investment strategy than its predecessors with hopes of becoming just as 
successful.   
Traditional vs. Progressive Sovereign Wealth Funds 
 With the sharp increases in oil prices in the 1970’s and again in the early 
2000’s two generations of sovereign wealth funds have emerged.  The group of 
SWFs established in the 1970s, including KIA and ADIA, are considered to be 
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traditional SWFs in that they adhere to a conservative, passive and relatively low 
profile investment strategy.  In contrast, the second generation of SWFs, like QIA, 
have emerged full force with a higher preference for risk and flashy investments.  
A report by the consulting firm, Monitor, observed this phenomenon: “These new 
funds have tended to take a more active investment approach, borrowing to invest 
in high-profile assets, rather than relying on their own capital accumulations.”113 
This is otherwise known as leverage, a practice that traditional sovereign wealth 
funds steer away from due to the higher exposure to risk.  The trend of moving 
from a conservative to an aggressive position in the markets was not limited to 
sovereign wealth funds.  In fact, the increasing financialization between 1990s 
and 2000s led to an overall increase in the appetite for risk for all investors.  This 
behavior is especially typical during a period of economic boom.   
 When comparing the two traditional sovereign wealth funds, KIA and 
ADIA are roughly 90% identical.114 They both pursue long-term, relatively 
conservative approaches seeking high returns, but without directly investing in 
companies and without seeking controlling stakes or board representation in a 
company.  They both make their investments by using external account managers.  
One slight difference is that KIA prefers to invest in funds of hedge funds while 
ADIA typically invests directly in hedge funds.  In contrast, newer funds are 
seeking to take a more active and aggressive approach by making large 
investments directly in high profile companies with the hope of achieving even 
higher returns.   
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 Regardless of the type of investment strategy, what has become evident is 
that both traditional and newer sovereign wealth funds have acquired a preference 
for high profile investments in major Western companies, especially financially 
troubled ones.   Such investments have catapulted SWFs from the shadows and 
into the public spotlight and consequently ignited a debate regarding their role and 
impact on global financial markets.  The next section will take a closer look at 
both sides of this heated debate, specifically whether or not sovereign wealth 
funds are a stabilizing or destabilizing force on the international financial markets.  
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SECTION 4 
Potential Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Global Financial 
Markets  
 
 Sovereign wealth funds’ emergence as major financial players did not 
progress gradually over their fifty plus years of existence, rather this phenomenon 
has come into fruition quite rapidly only over the past decade.   Although SWFs 
started to engage and participate in the global financial markets in the early 2000s, 
it was not until the onset of the financial crisis that their prowess was actually 
recognized:   
During 2007-2008, called upon by Western governments 
and institutions, they initially helped both their public 
image and the struggling economies of Western nations 
by contributing to recapitalize their crisis-stricken banks 
and by investing in important but troubled financial 
companies.115 
 
The ability of a foreign entity to rescue some of the most prominent 
Western financial institutions that could not save themselves, secured SWFs a 
position at the table of the major financial players of the world.  At the same time, 
it also caught the attention of Western governments, media and the general public 
and consequently ignited a debate regarding the impact of sovereign wealth funds 
on global financial markets.   More specifically, the debate boils down to the 
question of whether or not sovereign wealth funds act as a stabilizing force or 
destabilizing force on international markets.  This section will explore both sides 
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of the debate, the general consensus and finally the reactions of sovereign wealth 
funds. 
Sovereign Wealth Funds as Stabilizing Forces 
 Generally speaking, financial markets and economies experience periods 
of stability intertwined with phases of booms and busts.  Over the past century we 
have seen an example of this phenomenon with a period of general stability from 
1933 - 1973 and the economic boom in the mid 1990s-mid 2000’s followed by the 
onset of the global financial crisis in 2007.  The evident cyclical nature of the 
financial markets creates an opportunity for the major market players to decide 
how they want to react.   
Typically, financial actors practice pro-cyclical behavior meaning that 
when times are good, they like to ride it out and get the most out of the boom as 
they can.  For instance, when interest rates rise in a boom, banks more often than 
not decrease excess reserves in order to turn the reserves into profitable assets by 
extending more loans or making further investments.  In terms of the recent 
financial crisis, the over eagerness of banks to extend loans was great news for 
those who needed credit the most, but who were the least likely to get it.  “Readily 
available credit enabled many consumers with poor credit scores to obtain 
mortgages, classified as “subprime” because they were considered to be in the 
riskiest category of loans.”116  Most of these loans were adjustable rate 
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mortgages117 (ARMs) because with the steadily increasing housing prices, ARMs 
gave subprime borrowers the incentive to refinance at more attractive rates.  
However, as housing prices started to decline in 2006 these subprime borrowers 
were unable to repay their loans to the banks and many major providers of 
subprime loans started to collapse because they did not have enough reserves to 
cover the losses.   
In addition, the subprime crisis also highlighted the dangers of another 
financial practice known as securitization.118  In the case of subprime mortgages, 
securitization was the practice whereby after the banks issued a mortgage they 
would turn around, repackage it and sell it as a mortgage-backed security.  
Essentially, securitization allows for a bank to transform a liability into a 
moneymaking asset.  Once these original sub-prime mortgages started to default, 
investors around the world started to question the stability of the US financial 
system and their mortgage-backed investments and started to retreat.  As a result, 
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credit started to dry up, banks were no longer able to extend loans and the system 
as a whole was in desperate need of liquidity.  Where did troubled banks and 
institutions find massive pools of liquidity when they were in need?  Sovereign 
wealth funds.  
Anti-Cyclical Behavior 
 One of the key differences between sovereign wealth funds and other 
major investment vehicles, and the reason why they were able to rescue failing 
western institutions, boils down to their unique investment strategy.  “SWFs are 
recognized as contributing to the stability of the financial system due to their 
long-term horizons, the greater diversification of their portfolios, their average 
low level of indebtedness and the absence of liquidity risks.”119  Unlike Western 
banks that are more focused on making a profit based on short-term trends, SWFs 
are able to withstand crises because they are more interested in long-term trends 
rather than cycles of booms and busts.  As a matter of practice, SWFs invest in all 
types of asset classes as well as geographic locations, so if one asset class goes 
bust (like subprime mortgages) the other assets will be able to insulate the fund.  
Furthermore, as demonstrated by KIA and ADIA, SWFs typically do not engage 
in leveraging their assets, unlike the overleveraged banks in the US and thus do 
not have to worry about an absence of liquidity.   
 All of the aforementioned elements of SWFs’ unique investment strategy 
have allowed sovereign wealth funds to inherently engage in anti-cyclical 
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behavior.  Meaning that, “they are well placed to withstand market pressures in 
times of crisis, contribute to stabilizing financial markets and provide new sources 
of liquidity for global capital markets.”120 SWFs are anti-cyclical in this way 
because in times of crisis, when the majority of financial markets are sucked dry 
of credit and liquidity, SWFs are still able and willing to invest in these troubled 
institutions, rather than hibernating and waiting for a boom period to make a 
move.    
This exact behavior was exhibited in 2008 when SWFs made capital 
injections into failing Western banks, “providing sought-after liquidity and 
contributing to easing financial market turmoil.”121  Furthermore, as Richard 
Goldberg asserts it in his book, The Battle for Wall Street, “sovereign wealth 
funds are international capital dealers-open for business, open to all takers.”122   
The majority of Western financial institutions do not practice the same investment 
strategies as SWFs and are thus unable to demonstrate anti-cyclical behavior.   In 
retrospect of the financial crisis, the inherent anti-cyclical nature of sovereign 
wealth funds has bestowed upon them the ability to be strong stabilizing forces in 
the global financial markets.    
Mutual Interdependence 
 Thanks to their anti-cyclical role in global markets, sovereign wealth 
funds were able to provide liquidity to Western institutions on the verge of failure 
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during the recent financial crisis.  However, sovereign wealth funds did not make 
these investments as a form of charity.  In fact, the only reason why they made the 
investments in the first place was because they saw an opportunity to potentially 
make a profit in the long run.   KIA and QIA’s profitable returns on their 
investments in Citigroup and Barclays respectively, can be viewed as evidence of 
this claim.   This leads to a very important aspect of SWFs’ beneficial role in 
international finance, namely mutual interdependence.    “Not only do Western 
countries need the liquidity of SWFs, as proven by the financial crisis, but SWFs 
also need Western countries to keep their markets open to foreign investment.”123   
 This sense of mutual interdependence creates an environment where if one 
side turns its back on the other, it is a lose lose situation for all.  Hence, both 
Western institutions and GCC sovereign wealth funds have an incentive to 
continue to work together and engage in cross border investments.   Not only can 
both gain financially speaking, but this interdependence creates a spillover effect 
into the political arena as well.  “SWFs consolidate peaceful relations between 
nations by facilitating interdependence between home and recipient 
countries…investment across borders binds us together by creating actors with 
much to lose from political tension.”124 Thus, not only do sovereign wealth funds 
contribute to stability in the global financial markets, but by doing so they also 
promote stability in terms of international relations and diplomacy.  This point is 
of particular relevance in terms of the importance of fostering healthier and 
stronger ties between the Western world and the Arab world.    
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Sovereign Wealth Funds as Destabilizing Agents 
 Although GCC sovereign wealth funds were initially welcomed and 
praised as lenders of last resort during the 2007-2008 credit crunch,125 the very 
fact that they are the investment arms of foreign governments ignited a series of 
concerns.  “When you have private investors who are basically disciplined by the 
market, that’s a different kind of investment than if you have SWFs that are 
basically an arm of a government.”126 Hence, it does not come as a surprise that 
the concerns expressed regarding the impact of sovereign wealth funds on global 
financial markets are more political fears rather than financial.    
Threat of Political Motivations 
The main reasons for concern, stem primarily from the fact that they are a 
government entity rather than a private financial institution, they originate in 
regions like the Middle East which typically represent unstable, autocratic and 
undemocratic regimes, and that there is very little published to the public 
regarding their balance sheet and investment strategies.   All of the above 
seemingly worrisome characteristics of GCC sovereign wealth funds have 
culminated into a single concern with regards to the overall motives of SWFs.  
Specifically, the main concern for sovereign wealth funds critics is the degree to 
which SWFs are politically motivated rather than financially.  
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One of the main political concerns is that sovereign wealth funds could 
potentially take advantage of the sheer size and value of their financial resources 
by purchasing larger stakes in Western companies, ultimately trying to take full 
control of the companies they invest in.   More specifically, “critics worry about 
SWFs accumulating too large a stake in US financial interests.”127 While the U.S. 
indeed wanted and needed help from GCC SWFs in order to keep key financial 
institutions afloat, they started to panic and wonder how much foreign investment 
is too much? 
Along the same lines, the next worry regarding the motives of GCC 
sovereign wealth funds is the fear that they might try to target strategic industries 
for political reasons.  The main industries of concern are advanced technology, 
energy and defense.   “SWFs blur the line between public and private 
investment…Western nations worry about the security implications of foreign 
countries, including Persian Gulf states, acquiring important positions in key 
industries and companies.”128 This is a legitimate concern considering the 
potentially disastrous result if foreign governments were to use their sovereign 
wealth funds to acquire knowledge of sensitive sectors of the US economy.   
Sovereign Wealth Funds’ Response to Concerns 
With the onset of globalization, “developing countries were urged to open 
up their economies and financial system to catch up with the Western world.”129 
For years the West was the main champion and supporter of promoting free trade 
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and maintaining open economies.  Did the West mean to say that it welcomes free 
trade and investment, but only from other Western democratic nations?   
After sovereign wealth funds came to the rescue of failing Western 
financial institutions, they were not necessarily expecting praise or gratitude, but 
they certainly were not expecting to receive so much political backlash.  At the 
same time, the West was not anticipating the emergence of oil-exporting nations 
as financial giants.  “Since the early 2000s western policy makers and the general 
public have been surprised by the emergence of financial powerhouses from oil 
exporters, while these investors have been shocked by the antagonistic reception 
they have received in the US and some European countries.”130   
In general, “SWF executives argue that a close examination of their track 
records demonstrates their abstention from political interference and that their 
investments are driven by commercial interests.”131 Specifically, Muhammad al-
Jasser of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency explains that simply because of the 
countries they represent “it is like the SWFs are guilty until proven innocent.”132 
Similarly, the head of the Kuwait Investment Authority, Bader al-Saad exclaims, 
“Why is everybody after sovereign wealth funds? What have they done? Did they 
misbehave in any country where they invested in?... All they are talking about is a 
fear of something that did not happen and will not happen.”133 Lastly, the CEO of 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Co., Talal al-Zain, echoed his fellow executives’ 
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sentiments saying, “I hope the hype about the sovereign wealth funds doesn’t 
close the market, because that would be a shame.”134 
Reality of the Debate 
 In reality, the fear that sovereign wealth funds are a destabilizing force on 
international financial markets has been greatly exaggerated in public debate, to 
the point where the concerns have increasingly overshadowed the clear and 
evident stabilizing role of SWFs.  Furthermore, although the fears sound serious 
and could potentially be a reason for concern, at this point there is not nearly 
enough evidence to support the claim that SWFs are destabilizing forces on global 
financial markets.    
On the contrary, the evidence clearly sways in favor of the argument that 
sovereign wealth funds contribute to the stability of the financial system.  In fact, 
it is very difficult to identify any occasion where a SWF took advantage of their 
power for political gain in a host country.  Furthermore, the majority of sovereign 
wealth funds only take minority stakes in a company and do not seek board 
representation.  In short, “these funds are looking for investments, not control.”135  
This is inherent in the overall fact that sovereign wealth funds behave as ‘rational’ 
investors, seeking to maximize returns while minimizing risk.   
While the argument claiming that sovereign wealth funds are politically 
motivated turns out to be founded upon fear itself rather than evidence, there is 
one real potential risk looming in the debate.   The real risk is the rise of 
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protectionist136 measures as a result of the xenophobic attitudes of the west.  
“SWFs are concerned that the tight scrutiny of their activities could fuel 
sentiments of economic nationalism and trigger protectionist measures against the 
free flow of capital.”137  
Although the threat of protectionist policies is a concern for SWFs, 
paradoxically it would be the West who would be hurt the most by such measures.  
“Such fear is forcing the SWFs to be invested in other countries and in non-US 
firms, thereby protecting and improving some other countries’ way of life at the 
expense of ours.”138  Furthermore, “by making itself an anti-Arab bastion, the US 
is cutting itself off from better integration into the world economy and ultimately 
giving up market share for its goods and services to its competitors.139  
In fact, in response to the surge of xenophobic attitudes in the West, 
sovereign wealth funds have already started to reassess their investment 
strategies.  More and more, SWFs are decreasing their investments in the West 
and increasing investments in emerging markets, like Asia, where they can 
capitalize on much higher growth rates and enjoy a welcoming investment 
environment.  Unfortunately, in reality, the potential fear the West should really 
be concerned about is that the next time they find themselves in dire need of 
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liquidity, just as they did during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, their sovereign 
wealth fund friends might not be as eager to bail them out.  One can only imagine 
the actual destabilizing effects this would have on international financial markets.   
Up to this point, we have discussed the basic characteristics of sovereign 
wealth funds, followed by an in-depth case study of three main Middle Eastern 
SWFs and explored both sides of the debate regarding their potential impact on 
international financial markets.  After broadening the scope to include the world 
of global finance we can now return to the traditional literature on oil-exporting 
nations and readdress the arguments in light of this new perspective.   Thus, in the 
next section we will turn our attention from international financial markets back 
towards the domestic economies of SWFs’ home countries.   
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SECTION 5 
Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on Regional and Domestic 
Economies 
 
The main objectives of the Middle Eastern SWFs are to secure long-term wealth 
for future generations, generate funds necessary for future pension and 
healthcare liabilities, and minimize their countries’ reliance on oil income.  
However, the funds also face domestic political pressures to support local 
economies and achieve short- term returns.  This pressure has become more 
pronounced in the wake of the global financial crisis, which broke out in 2008.140 
 
 Between 2005-2008, the rise of GCC sovereign wealth funds as major 
players in international finance as well as the numerous high profile deals pursued 
attracted an immense amount of attention and critique.   While the initial debate 
focused primarily on the impact of sovereign wealth funds on global financial 
markets, another debate was unfolding as a result of the losses incurred by SWFs 
during the financial crisis.  The fact that SWFs and their home economies suffered 
as a result of the global financial crisis proved that despite their massive wealth 
and ability to bail out Western institutions, they were not invincible and 
completely immune to global recessions.   As a result, SWFs faced a new internal 
pressure to aid their domestic economies: “Why were the SWF’s available to 
rescue Western Banks but not to invest strategically at home?”141  
SWFs have not been forced to rethink their strategies by the 
losses they have sustained or a lack of attractive opportunities. 
Rather they have been constrained by economic and political 
factors, which have forced many funds to look to investing at 
home to help develop and diversify, or to bail out and support 
flagging local financial sectors and stock markets.142 
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 After 2008, in response to both the external criticism and domestic pressures 
GCC sovereign wealth funds were forced to rethink their strategies, primarily in a 
geographic sense.  In response to the external pressures and protectionist 
sentiments from the West, we have already seen and continue to see GCC SWFs 
investing more and more in emerging markets, like Asia, where they can earn a 
higher rate of return and have their investments welcomed.   In addition, in 
response to the mounting domestic pressures SWFs had to take into account the 
long-term development needs of their own countries and regions.  Either 
traditional SWFs made adjustments to include domestic considerations or new 
SWFs were created as sovereign development funds with the primary focus of 
domestic development.   
 The high oil prices experienced in the 1970s and between 2002-2008 not 
only generated massive revenues for GCC countries, but also generated a familiar 
and inevitable question:  to what extent will these oil revenues be used to address 
and alleviate the GCCs’ economic setbacks?   While the answer to this question 
varies from country to country, a few common features have historically 
characterized the GCC economies.  Namely, a high dependency on oil, high 
reliance on expatriate labor, a young and rapidly expanding national labor force 
and dominant public sector overshadowing a weak private sector.143  This section 
will begin by providing an overview of the traditional long-term economic 
development goals aimed at addressing the aforementioned concerns.  This will 
be followed by an examination of the current economic landscape in three of the 
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main GCC oil-exporting countries: Kuwait, Qatar and UAE.  Finally, this section 
will conclude with a closer look at the extent to which two traditional funds (KIA 
& QIA) and one new sovereign development fund (Mubadala) are addressing 
these long-term development goals and domestic pressures.  
Long-Term Development Goals of GCC Economies 
 
While the GCC economies have experienced common setbacks over the 
years, such as the dependence on oil, an underdeveloped private sector and 
overreliance on foreign workers, they also face a common set of long-term goals 
to potentially overcome the aforementioned challenges.  The primary long-term 
economic goals are economic diversification away from oil, the expansion of the 
non-oil private sector and the attraction of strategic foreign direct investments. 
Economic Diversification  
The primary overarching long-term development goal for all oil-exporting 
nations is economic diversification.  Once oil was discovered, GCC countries 
became completely dependent upon oil, with petroleum contributing to well over 
half of GDP144 and to nearly all of the government revenues (as previously 
discussed, this is otherwise known as a rentier state).  As is often the case, it is 
riskier to put all of your eggs in one basket rather than spread out across multiple 
baskets.  This is especially true when the resource a country’s economy depends 
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on is non-renewable and the price is determined in international markets. 
“Because of the boom-and bust- cycles associated with many world commodity 
markets, the rent-producing sector can be a highly unreliable source.”145 Hence, 
the extreme volatility of oil prices makes it a very risky commodity to depend 
upon.   
The aforementioned risks facing oil-based economies gave GCC countries 
the desire to find ways to “extend economic life beyond finite oil resources.”146   
In other words, GCC countries soon realized the strong necessity to diversify their 
economies away from oil.  There are two main ways to diversify an economy.  
The first method is the diversification of income in an effort to insulate a country 
from volatility and risk.  This has been accomplished primarily by investing 
abroad via sovereign wealth funds.   Income diversification promotes fiscal 
stability by insuring that a country generates revenue from a wide variety of 
activities rather than relying on a single source.  This is the same reason why 
investors pursue a diversified portfolio, because if one asset suffers the other 
assets act as a buffer and keep the investors afloat. 
The second method of economic diversification is the diversification of 
production.  This is primarily accomplished by investing domestically in a 
country.   While income diversification promotes fiscal stability, production 
diversification aims to promote social stability by targeting the labor markets.  
The primary consequence of oil-exporting nations’ lack of economic diversity is 
massive domestic unemployment.   Over the past thirty years, the Arab region has 
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seen improvements in terms of basic economic benchmarks such as a reduction in 
infant mortality coupled with a slight decrease in the fertility rates.  “The result is 
a rapidly expanding population, with vast numbers of young people.”147 The 
problem is that “in order to provide enough jobs for the young, their economies 
would have to grow at rates similar to those of China and India, and so far they 
haven’t.”148 Thus, even though many Arab countries have expanded their higher-
education system to accommodate their growing young population, the problem is 
that there are simply not enough jobs to employ them after graduation.  “Unlike in 
the United States and other Western countries, the unemployment rate increases 
with the level of educational attainment.” 149  
Private Sector Expansion 
Furthermore, the citizens who are lucky enough to be employed work 
predominantly in the public sector.   The private sector is relatively 
underdeveloped and is heavily dominated by foreign workers, all further 
contributing to high levels of domestic unemployment.  “Expatriate workers now 
account in most GCC countries for about three-fourths of the total workforce. 
These countries have maintained an open-door policy to attract expatriate 
labor.”150  Hence, the rapidly expanding local workforce coupled with limited 
employment opportunities in the private sector has generated massive amounts of 
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unemployment.  Therefore, the main long-term development goal for oil-
exporting nations should be to reduce unemployment by focusing on expanding 
and developing a strong private sector, specifically labor-intensive manufacturing 
and service sectors.  More specifically, the emphasis should be placed on 
developing so called strategic sectors like “agriculture, food processing, the water 
sector, education, health care and renewable energy.”151  These are all industries 
that produce social benefits to the greater population and can lead to a reduction 
in a wide variety of economic indicators like poverty, disease, illiteracy and 
unemployment.  
Attract Foreign Direct Investment 
Lastly, one of the key goals for developing economies is to attract foreign 
direct investment.  Once the basic foundation of an economy has been developed 
or in this case once an economy has started to diversify its production, it can start 
to attract foreign direct investment to further develop the domestic economy.  
Along with the much-needed inflow of foreign capital and funding, some of the 
greatest byproducts of foreign direct investment include “technology spillovers, 
assists human capital formation, contributes to international trade integration, 
helps create a more competitive business environment and enhances enterprise 
development…all of these contribute to higher economic growth.”152   In 
conclusion, only by pursuing the dual goals of income and production 
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diversification can GCC countries truly achieve economic diversification and 
ultimately economic growth.   
 
Current Economic Landscape & 
 GCC SWF Responses to Domestic Pressures 
 
 On the surface, the boom in oil prices from 2002 to 2008 greatly 
strengthened and rejuvenated the GCC economies on a macro level.  For the six 
GCC countries, “real gross domestic product (GDP) growth reached an average of 
8 percent a year over the 2002–2007 period while average GDP per capita across 
the six countries grew about 32%.”153 While these are indeed impressive measures 
of economic growth, they tell us very little about the progress, or lack thereof, 
GCC countries have made in addressing their long-term development goals.   The 
following section will examine the current economic situation, beyond economic 
growth indicators, for Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.  In addition, it 
will also assess the role each country’s sovereign wealth fund is playing in 
addressing the long-term goals.   
 
Kuwait 
 
 As a country slightly smaller than the state of New Jersey, Kuwait has 
managed to compensate for its small geographic size in lieu of its enormous oil-
based wealth.   Before the discovery of oil in 1938, Kuwait’s economy was based 
almost entirely on the pearling industry.154   From the discovery of oil onward and 
even up to present day, the economy of Kuwait is extremely dependent upon oil.  
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With the possession of about 9% of world oil reserves, “petroleum accounts for 
nearly half of GDP, 95% of export revenues and 95% of government income.”155  
Hence, the stability and strength of the domestic economy remains closely linked 
with world oil prices. 
 The large oil revenues have allowed Kuwait to enjoy the 8th highest GDP 
per capita in the world, however growth in per capita income is only a measure of 
economic growth, not a measure of economic development.   As a result, “Kuwait 
has done little to diversify its economy.”156  In fact, because Kuwait has very 
limited industry outside of oil it is forced to import almost all agriculture and 
manufactured goods.  Furthermore, around 60% of the labor force is comprised of 
non-Kuwaitis, contributing to an unemployment rate of around 2.2%.  While an 
unemployment rate of 2.2% is not considered high, the fact that the majority of 
the labor force is still comprised of foreign workers is still a cause for concern.  
Despite having an extremely young and literate population (94.4%), Kuwait does 
not have the industry diversification or investment in human capital to make use 
of its population’s potential.   
 The main setback for the Kuwaiti economy is the extremely 
underdeveloped private sector.  “The total number of private enterprises is around 
25000, of which 2700 or about 1% has around 10 employees, 60% have less than 
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30 and 15% have less than 50 employees.”157 Furthermore, the majority of these 
small private enterprises are concentrated in the tourism, construction and 
financial services industries.  Lastly, only around 5% of Kuwaitis are employed in 
the private sector as compared to 95% in the public sector.158 
 The Kuwaiti government has recognized the urgent need for economic 
diversification and thus recently passed an economic development plan “that 
pledges to spend up to $130 billion in five years to diversify the economy away 
from oil, attract more investment, and boost private sector participation in the 
economy.”159  While this plan appears to encompass the general long-term 
development goals facing most oil-exporting countries, only time will tell if the 
plan is implemented to the full extent.  If it is, the benefits the plan could bring to 
Kuwait’s economy are undeniable.    
 
Kuwait Investment Authority 
 
The official self-stated role of KIA in the local economy is as follows:160  
• Promotes and supports institutionalization of the market by 
setting up funds and companies to promote and finance local 
business, and participates in the launching of local 
investments with feasible economic returns 
• Helps develop the role of local financial companies by giving 
them the opportunity to manage some of their investments 
locally and abroad 
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• Maintains the private sector’s regeneration through 
privatization programs that KIA is committed to undertake 
• Provides liquidity to the State’s Treasury when needed 
• As detailed in the role of the Local Investment Department, 
KIA has set up several companies in the last few years, 
primarily to promote investment in Kuwait. 
 
The Kuwait Investment Authority, as the oldest sovereign wealth fund, 
was created to invest abroad in order to diversify the local economy. While KIA 
has indeed contributed to the fiscal stability of Kuwait by boosting the 
government’s revenues significantly over the years, it was not established to 
engage directly in domestic investments.  However, in the wake of the global 
financial crisis, traditional funds like KIA, who have been primarily 
internationally focused, have received a new wave of domestic pressure to rethink 
their strategies with the direct needs of the local economy in mind.   
While many traditional sovereign wealth funds have long been critiqued 
for not directly investing in the local economy and thus not benefitting the people 
of the country, KIA was the first of the traditional funds to actually give in to 
domestic economic concerns.  “In December 2008, the KIA launched a fund on 
behalf of the Kuwaiti government to stabilize the local stock market, which had 
fallen 38% in 2008.”161 In addition to this stabilizing move in 2008, managing 
director, Bader al-Saad, asserts that KIA is looking to play a larger role in 
strengthening the private sector, developing local human capital and facilitating 
the transfer of technology.  However, Al-Saad also acknowledges the difficulty of 
this role: “we don’t want people criticizing us for not investing locally, but if we 
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did, we would find ourselves competing with the private sector.”162 Thus, KIA’s 
strategy is to complement the private sector by investing in the sectors it shies 
away from instead of directly competing with it.   
One excellent example of how KIA is strategically complementing the 
Private sector is its creation of the Kuwait Small Project Development Company 
(KSPDC).  In 1997 KIA established KSPDC as a venture capital firm in order to 
assist young Kuwaiti nationals establish their own small-midsize enterprises.  As 
a matter of practice, KSPDC can provide a maximum of 80%, up to 400,000 
dinars, of the capital needed to start a business.  Gradually, KSPDC works with 
the entrepreneur until he or she is able to buy them out.   
Kuwaiti national, Bedoor al Mutairi is just one of several entrepreneurs to 
benefit from KSPDC’s support.  After experiencing the frustrating and negative 
connotation associated with women riding in taxis in Kuwait (due to the 
conservative values of Kuwaiti society) Mutairi asked herself: “why does 
someone not start a taxi company with women drivers for an exclusively female 
clientele?”163 Mutairi soon realized that a similar concept was already in place in 
Dubai, Tehran and Beirut and with the support of KSPDC, she was able to bring 
the same opportunity to Kuwait.  “Companies that sell products and services to 
women are clamoring to have their brochures placed in the cabs and Ms al Mutairi 
gets about 20 calls a day from Kuwaiti women saying they want to try the 
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service.”164 Hopefully Mutairi’s successful business venture will inspire other 
young Kuwaitis to follow in her footsteps.   
 While KIA does explicitly lay out its role in the local economy, it has 
always maintained a very passive and indirect approach to local investments up 
until the financial crisis.  Although KIA stepped in when the Kuwaiti economy 
was suffering, it will most likely continue to prefer its traditional role of investing 
abroad over taking a more aggressive approach to domestic development.  
However, the creation of subsidiaries in order to complement and support the 
growth of the private sector, such as the Kuwait Small Projects Development 
Company, illuminates how KIA does greatly impact the domestic economy of 
Kuwait, albeit indirectly.  
                             
Qatar 
 
Like many other Middle Eastern countries, Qatar too started out as a poor 
nation with an economy based solely on pearling up until the discovery of oil in 
1940.  After gaining independence in 1971, Qatar continued to suffer due to the 
siphoning off of petroleum revenues the hands of a corrupt Amir until 1995 when 
he was overthrown.  Starting in 1995 Qatar embarked on a process of economic 
transformation to “transform its former rent-based economy into a knowledge-
based, service-orientated society.”165 The most obvious result of this 
transformation is the fact that even despite the global financial crisis, Qatar has 
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the world’s highest growth rate at an impressive 19.4% and the highest GDP per 
capita in the world of $145,300.166 
Although Qatar has indeed undergone a major transformation, there are 
still areas in need of improvement.  Today, “economic policy is focused on 
developing Qatar’s nonassociated natural gas reserves and increasing private and 
foreign investment in non-energy sectors.”167  This is crucial due to the fact that 
oil and gas still account for more than 50% of GDP, 85% of export earnings and 
70% of government revenues.168  In addition, the country could benefit from 
increased diversification by further developing its service sector and agricultural 
sector, which represent 21.1% and .1% respectively.169   
 
Qatar Investment Authority 
 
 
 In comparison with traditional sovereign wealth funds like KIA and 
ADIA, the Qatar Investment Authority best exemplifies the second generation of 
SWFs, characterized by a much more active and aggressive investment style when 
compared to their predecessors.   Although only recently established in 2005, QIA 
has rapidly become notorious for making large, high profile investments in 
European companies such as Volkswagen, Credit Suisse and Barclays.   In fact, 
QIA was the most active SWF investor throughout the global financial crisis 
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because while most funds significantly cut back on investments, QIA continued to 
pursue an active investment strategy.   
However, this does not mean that the country of Qatar did not feel the 
effects of the global financial crises.  Similarly to KIA, in 2008 QIA was also 
called upon by the local Qatari government to invest “$5.3 billion into the local 
financial sector to buy a 20% stake in all the banks listed on the Qatar stock 
exchange.”170 Although QIA is part of the second generation of sovereign wealth 
funds, its main credo is still to build a global investment portfolio in order to 
achieve income diversification for the country of Qatar.  In other words, although 
it is much more aggressive than its traditional predecessors, it has not shifted its 
core purpose and it will not operate as a development fund in wake of the 
financial crisis.  Instead, what these second generation SWFs have started to do to 
respond to local pressures is to designate a preexisting segment of the fund to 
engage in domestic development.  For QIA, this role was assigned to its real 
estate development arm Qatari Diar.   
Qatari Diar is “fully owned by the Qatar Investment Authority and was 
founded to support Qatar’s rapidly expanding economy and to provide structure 
and quality control for the country’s real estate development priorities.”171 The 
most prominent example of Qatari Diar’s mission in terms of domestic 
development was its $26 billion deal with “Germany’s national railway operator, 
Deutsche Bahn AG (DB), to build a railroad network over 15 years” in a joint 
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venture with the Qatar Railways Development Company.172  The railroad network 
will include a metro system in the city of Doha, a light rail in Lusail as well as a 
high-speed line between Qatar and its neighbors Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.  The 
benefits of this joint venture are indeed quite significant: 
By increasing Qatar’s links to regional markets and 
improving export routes this project is central to the 
diversification of the emirate’s economy, which is largely 
reliant on oil exports.  The cooperation will also include DB 
providing vocational training in the rail sector for young 
Qataris, helping the transfer of valuable expertise to the local 
population.173 
 
By embodying the key long-term development goals such as production 
diversification, job creation, and knowledge and technology transfer, Qatari 
Diar’s joint venture is an excellent example of an investment made in order to 
truly advance the long-term development goals of Qatar.   
 
United Arab Emirates 
 
 One of the greatest stories of state transformation is that of the UAE.  
Over thirty years ago in 1971, seven tiny tribal states in the Persian Gulf came 
together to form the United Arab Emirates.  Over the next thirty plus years, the 
UAE managed to transform itself from a poor, desolate fishing and pearling 
community into a modern state rivaling many Western nations.  “Not too long, 
there were no air-conditioned buildings in the UAE - in fact, there was no 
electricity network to provide relief from the searing heat of the summer months.  
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Suddenly all this changed with the discovery of oil.”174  After witnessing fellow 
oil-exporting countries’ tribulations after the discovery of oil, the UAE was 
determined to follow a different, more prosperous path.  As Sheikh Abdullah bin 
Zayed Al Nahyan, UAE Minister of Information and Culture, states “the social 
and cultural well-being of our society has been the target of our planning, and all 
other aspects of our development, be they economic, political, social or 
environmental, stem from this consideration.”175    
To what degree has the UAE succeeded in their mission?  For starters, 
from 1995 to 2008, UAE GDP increased more than 500% from $46 billion to 
$240 billion.176 This tremendous growth can be attributed to fact that the country 
has the fifth largest oil reserves in the world.  One of the greatest pieces of 
evidence demonstrating the UAE’s success in achieving economic diversification 
is that unlike Qatar and Kuwait, it has been able to reduce the portion of GDP 
based on oil and gas to 25%.177  This is due to the “progressive economic agenda 
built around economic liberalization, diversification and enhancing the role of the 
private sector.”178  The Emirate of Dubai is an excellent example of this policy 
due to focusing “its attention of the development of the services sector, tourism 
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and large-scale real estate projects.”179 Some of the most notorious projects 
include the world’s only seven-star hotel, the Burj al-Arab, or the world’s tallest 
tower, the Burj Dubai, and the infamous Palm Islands, the largest man-made 
islands in the world.180   
However, despite all of the UAE’s tremendous strides in economic 
development, it too was not immune from the global financial crisis in 2008.  
After 2008, the UAE’s growth rate started to slow along with the majority of 
countries around the world.  Furthermore, while Dubai has become a symbol of 
modernity, massive financial wealth and prosperity it was also hit the hardest out 
of the Emirates due to its prominent real estate and finance sector.  Large-scale 
projects were not able to receive funding due to severely depressed real estate 
prices, prompting worries about the future of Dubai.  Luckily, Dubai received 
funding from the central banks as well as its neighboring Emirate, Abu Dhabi.   
Even with all of the remarkable growth experienced by the UAE over the 
past thirty plus years, the recent global financial crisis revealed that there is still 
plenty of work to be done.  “Dependence on oil, a large expatriate workforce, and 
growing inflation pressures are significant long-term challenges.”181 To address 
these long-term concerns, the government has implemented a plan focusing on 
“diversification and creating more opportunities for nationals through improved 
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education and increase private sector employment.”182 Given the country’s track 
record and consistent emphasis on socio-economic development, the plan will 
hopefully lead the UAE to even more success and prosperity in the future.   
Mubadala Development Company 
 
 Due to the fact that most sovereign wealth funds, especially first 
generation, but also second generation funds, are not designed or willing to 
actively engage in direct investments in the local economy, a new generation of 
sovereign wealth funds has emerged to fill this position.   
Beyond achieving high returns on investments, some of these 
funds were specifically tasked by their governments to 
transfer technology, build infrastructure, establish health and 
transportation services and create new industries, basically to 
contribute to the development of the nation.183 
 
Since the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the largest sovereign wealth fund in 
the world, “as a matter of practice, does not invest in the UAE,”184 in 2002 the 
government of Abu Dhabi created separate entity known as the Mubadala 
Development Company in order to facilitate the diversification of Abu Dhabi’s 
economy.   
 Mubadala is “a business development and investment company whose 
mandate is to expand not just the emirate’s wealth but also to create industries that 
will develop the economy.”185 It is primarily focused on targeting key industries 
such as energy, healthcare, aerospace, information and telecommunications, 
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infrastructure, real estate and hospitality and services.186   On one hand, Mubadala 
acts like more traditional SWFs by pursuing high profile, long-term international 
investments with the goal of receiving a high rate of return.  However, the 
difference is that it will not make an investment that will not deliver “strong social 
returns to Abu Dhabi and the United Arab Emirates.”187 Social benefits include 
knowledge and technology transfer, employment opportunities for citizens and 
attracting further direct investment.   
 The best example of what Mubadala and other sovereign wealth funds of 
this type are aiming to achieve is the extremely high profile $8 billion joint 
venture between Mubadala and General Electric in 2008.  “The venture is focused 
on diverse initiatives including commercial finance, clean energy research and 
development, aviation and corporate learning.”188 The benefits for Mubadala and 
the UAE include the following: knowledge transfer via an established training 
program sponsored by GE, technology transfer in terms of clean energy and 
aviation technology as well as infrastructure, job creation and industry 
development.  At the same time, the joint venture provides significant benefits for 
GE as well including the fact that Mubadala became a top ten shareholder in GE 
and that the partnership will open up access for GE to a new market and a new 
region altogether.   All in all, the Mubadala Development Company represents the 
ideal marriage between income diversification as well as production 
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diversification and will continue to provide meaningful contributions to not only 
the UAE, but to the entire region as well.   
 The main takeaway message regarding the significance of the global 
financial crisis is realization that sovereign wealth funds “were no different from 
other institutional investors; they had not been immune from the ravages of the 
recession”189 and more importantly it revealed that their own domestic economies 
were in significant need of assistance.   Besides the suffering experienced in the 
local financial sectors, the crisis revealed the primary long-term development 
goals for the countries including knowledge and technology transfer, private 
sector development, and huge overall need for job creation.   Pressure and critique 
mounted as many locals were witnessing sovereign wealth funds bail out failing 
Western institutions without bailing out their own domestic economies, prompting 
SWFs to reassess their investment strategies.  
 In terms of the first generation of SWFs, although some like KIA helped 
financially prop up the local financial industry, their role has remained basically 
unchanged: they were not established to perform direct local investment.  
However, after further examination we discovered a trend of indirect domestic 
investment on behalf of both traditional funds like KIA and second-generation 
funds like QIA.  For KIA, this meant the establishment of a separate entity to 
promote the growth of emerging private enterprises while QIA opted to allocate a 
pre-existing section of the fund to carry out direct local investments.  
Furthermore, when SWFs like ADIA were completely reluctant to change their 
investment strategy to include domestic investments, the government established 
                                                        
189
 Miracky & Bortolotti 2010, 17. 
  
72
a third generation of SWFs, like Mubadala, as a designated direct investor.   What 
all three funds have in common is the fact that although some are more focused 
on domestic economic development, all three remain very active abroad.   
 The difference between the three generations of SWFs in terms of their 
impact on domestic socio-economic development is the degree to which the fund 
combines income diversification and production diversification.  Traditionally, 
SWFs have only been successful in terms of income diversification because their 
main goal has been to turn oil, a depletable and non-renewable asset, into a 
financial asset.  While this is key for income diversification, the problem is that 
financial assets are just as depletable and non-renewable as oil.  In other words, 
they do not count as real investments.   “Wealth cannot simply be created by 
financial and/or monetary devices.  Wealth can only be created by adding to the 
real assets on the ground.”190 Thus, only the sovereign wealth funds that ‘add real 
assets on the ground’ like, knowledge and technology transfer, job creation and 
industry development can truly claim that they are successfully promoting and 
achieving economic development.  
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Concluding Thoughts: 
 More often than not, the media is prone to framing relatively unknown 
concepts in terms of good and bad in an attempt to simplify an issue for the 
public.  However, the problem with this method is that it also leads to a 
detachment from rational thought in lieu of sensationalist rhetoric.  Unfortunately, 
sovereign wealth funds are the latest victim of the polarizing treatment by the 
media and consequently their image has been reduced to simply: villains or 
heroes.  However, because SWFs are a heterogeneous and complex class of 
investors, it is neither realistic nor pragmatic to view SWFs in terms of good or 
bad.  Thus, throughout this study it has been my goal to explore the various 
images of sovereign wealth funds in an attempt to isolate sensationalist claims.  
As a result, we are left with a more rational and realistic perspective of what 
sovereign wealth funds truly symbolize.   
Represent Shift in Global Financial Power 
 Early in the 20th century, the world experienced a major power shift from 
the dominance of oil consuming countries by ‘the Majors’ to the increased 
sovereignty of oil-exporting countries via the formation of OPEC.  With the 
commencement of the 21st century, the world witnessed another significant shift 
in financial power and redistribution of global wealth.  With rising oil prices, oil-
exporting nations once again accumulated massive revenues and emerging 
markets, particularly Asian countries, were experiencing rapid economic growth.  
At the same time, Western developed countries like the United States and Europe 
were experiencing current account deficits and an ensuing financial crisis.  While 
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Western financial institution largely dominated the 20th century, the financial 
crisis exposed their weaknesses and provided an opportunity for new players, 
specifically oil-exporting countries and emerging markets, to enter the 
international markets and compete for financial clout.   
 One can say that sovereign wealth funds capitalized on this opportunity 
and emerged as major players in international finance.  While this symbolizes the 
geographic shift in financial power from the West to the East, it is also indicative 
of another change.  Since SWFs are an extension a government, their rise 
represents a more general trend of the rise in state-capitalism as opposed to 
traditional free-market capitalism.  “This emerging and growing framework is at 
sharp variance with today’s general conception of a market-based global economy 
and financial system.”191 For many, this ‘variance’ has been the main cause for 
concern regarding the motives of SWFs.  While the West in particular is 
uncomfortable with the prospect of foreign governments dominating global 
financial markets, the real fear is the potential for protectionist backlash if the 
West is unable to come to terms and adapt to the financial landscape of the future.     
Behave as Rational Investors 
 Although the West is concerned about the potential for sovereign wealth 
funds to be manipulated in order to achieve political motives there is little 
evidence to date to validate this fear.  In fact, “empirical evidence indicates that 
SWFs have behaved as economically rational investors who seek to maximize 
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their profits through the proper combination of risk and return.”192  They pursue 
long-term investments, a highly diversified portfolio both geographically and by 
asset class, they have low levels of debt by avoiding the practice of leveraging 
and they minimize exposure to liquidity risks by maintaining an excess level of 
reserves.  All of the aforementioned attributes allowed SWFs to exhibit anti-
cyclical behavior during the recent financial crisis and confirmed their role as a 
stabilizing force on global financial markets. 
 All in all, sovereign wealth funds should be viewed as a rational 
institutional investor.  Although all types of investors have been the subjects of 
critique during the financial crisis, there are some positive attributes separating 
sovereign wealth funds from other type of financial investors.  Thus, sovereign 
wealth funds think the world should “relax a little.  We are only thinking about 
noncontrolling, conventional investments.  We’re not the sell-side firms, thinking 
‘proprietary trading’.  We’re not the exchanges, thinking ‘consolidation’.  We’re 
not the private equity firms, thinking ‘management control’.  And we’re not the 
hedge funds, thinking ‘leverage.’”193  While the world of finance is far from 
perfect, SWF’s clean track record should speak for itself and they should at least 
be treated to the courtesy of innocent until proven guilty.   
Reinforce State Sovereignty 
Whenever the issues of oil-exporting nations and petrodollars are brought 
to the table the most popular question raised is the following:  how are the 
petrodollars being invested?  According to traditional literature, there is only one 
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avenue for petrodollars to flow and that is directly into the corrupt coffers of the 
national government.  As a result, oil-exporting countries inevitably fall victim to 
the resource curse.    By expanding the scope of traditional literature to include 
the role of global financial markets, sovereign wealth funds emerged as the main 
vehicle for petrodollar recycling.  
Without a doubt, the rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds secured them a seat 
at the table with the other major players in international finance.  However, what 
has this emergence meant for the SWF’s domestic economies and home 
countries?  To address this question I sought out to explore the extent to which 
sovereign wealth funds could serve as tools for economic development.  
However, sovereign wealth funds, at the core, were not established to engage 
directly in domestic development.  While the financial crisis of 2008 led many 
SWFs to restructure and reconsider the pressing needs of their domestic 
economies it wasn’t necessarily their responsibility to intervene.  Thus, when 
SWFs received criticism for not investing enough in their local economies, the 
age-old problem regarding the efficiency of petrodollar recycling appears to 
remain unchanged.  However, this is not entirely bad news.  On the flip side, we 
did see the development of a new type of sovereign wealth fund, sovereign 
development funds, whose responsibility is to pursue only investments that are in 
line with long-term economic development.   
In conclusion, the expansion of the narrow traditional perspective to a new 
international one highlights a wide array of implications for both global financial 
markets and the home countries of sovereign wealth funds.  First, sovereign 
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wealth funds represent a general shift in financial power away from the West and 
towards emerging markets.  While this trend has sparked fears and concerns 
regarding the potential political motivations of SWFs, their track record 
demonstrates that these fears have been overstated.  While sovereign wealth funds 
should not be viewed in terms of villains or heroes, they should be taken seriously 
as major financial players.    
Furthermore, they symbolize the fact that oil-exporting nations learned 
from the mistakes they made in previous booms and decided to save revenues for 
the future in lieu of excessive spending in the present.  Not only do sovereign 
wealth funds secure their nations’ wealth for future generations, but also most 
importantly, their role as major players in international finance reinforces oil-
exporting countries’ sense of sovereignty and power on the world stage.    
Lastly, when it comes to the potential role of sovereign wealth funds in 
economic development the answer is not as conclusive.  Traditional sovereign 
wealth funds, like ADIA, do not directly contribute to the long-term development 
goals of their country and thus should not be viewed as tools for economic 
development.  However, while the goal of my thesis was not to evaluate the 
effectiveness of SWFs as tools for economic development, I do want to highlight 
the potential for a new type of development strategy that is aligned with global 
financial markets.  All in all, while the impact of sovereign wealth funds on 
international financial markets and their domestic economies may continue to 
evolve, it is important to continue to evaluate SWFs in a realistic and pragmatic 
manner rather than fall victim to sensationalist claims.     
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: List of Largest Sovereign Wealth Funds by Year Established 
LARGEST SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS BY YEAR ESTABLISHED 
Country Fund Name Assets 
 $ Billion 
Year 
Established Type 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $260  1953 Oil 
Kiribati Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund $0.40  1956 Phosphates 
US – New Mexico New Mexico State Investment Council $13.80  1958 Non-Commodity 
Singapore Temasek Holdings $145.30  1974 Non-Commodity 
US – Wyoming Permanent Wyoming Mineral Trust 
Fund 
$4.70  1974 Minerals 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority $627  1976 Oil 
US – Alaska Alaska Permanent Fund $39.70  1976 Oil 
Canada Alberta’s Heritage Fund $14.40  1976 Oil 
Oman State General Reserve Fund $8.20  1980 Oil & Gas 
Singapore Government of Singapore 
Investment Corporation 
$247.50  1981 Non-Commodity 
Brunei Brunei Investment Agency $30  1983 Oil 
UAE – Abu Dhabi International Petroleum 
Investment Company 
$48.20  1984 Oil 
Chile Social and Economic Stabilization 
Fund 
$21.80  1985 Copper 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global $556.80  1990 Oil 
China – Hong Kong Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority Investment Portfolio 
$292.30  1993 Non-Commodity 
Malaysia Khazanah Nasional $36.80  1993 Non-Commodity 
Botswana Pula Fund $6.90  1994 Diamonds & 
Minerals China SAFE Investment Company $347.1** 1997 Non-Commodity 
Venezuela FEM $0.80  1998 Oil 
Iran Oil Stabilisation Fund $23  1999 Oil 
Azerbaijan State Oil Fund $21.70  1999 Oil 
China National Social Security Fund $146.50  2000 Non-Commodity 
Algeria Revenue Regulation Fund $56.70  2000 Oil 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund $38.60  2000 Oil 
Trinidad & Tobago Heritage and Stabilization Fund $2.90  2000 Oil 
Ireland National Pensions Reserve Fund $33  2001 Non-Commodity 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Mubadala Development Company $13.30  2002 Oil 
New Zealand New Zealand Superannuation Fund $12.10  2003 Non-Commodity 
Australia Australian Future Fund $72.90  2004 Non-Commodity 
Nigeria Excess Crude Account $0.50  2004 Oil 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority $85  2005 Oil 
South Korea Korea Investment Corporation $37  2005 Non-Commodity 
East Timor Timor-Leste Petroleum Fund $6.30  2005 Oil & Gas 
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UAE – Ras Al 
Khaimah 
RAK Investment Authority $1.20  2005 Oil 
Libya Libyan Investment Authority $70  2006 Oil 
UAE – Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai $19.60  2006 Oil 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company $9.10  2006 Oil 
Vietnam State Capital Investment Corporation $0.50  2006 Non-Commodity 
Indonesia Government Investment Unit $0.30  2006 Non-Commodity 
Mauritania National Fund for Hydrocarbon 
Reserves 
$0.30  2006 Oil & Gas 
Oman Oman Investment Fund n/a 2006 Oil 
China China Investment Corporation $332.40  2007 Non-Commodity 
China China-Africa Development Fund $5.00  2007 Non-Commodity 
UAE – Federal Emirates Investment Authority n/a 2007 Oil 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Council n/a 2007 Oil 
Russia National Welfare Fund $142.5* 2008 Oil 
France Strategic Investment Fund $28  2008 Non-Commodity 
Saudi Arabia Public Investment Fund $5.30  2008 Oil 
Brazil Sovereign Fund of Brazil $8.60  2009 Non-Commodity 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $439.10  n/a Oil 
 Total Oil & Gas Related $2,520.20    
 Total Other $1,792.90    
 TOTAL $4,313.10    
     
*This includes the oil stabilization fund of Russia. 
**This number is a best guess estimation. 
***All figures quoted are from official sources, or, where the institutions concerned do not issue statistics of their 
assets, from other publicly available sources. Some of these figures are best estimates as market values change day to 
day. 
 
Source: "Sovereign Wealth Fund Rankings." Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute. Mar. 2011. Web. 24 Apr. 2011. 
<http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/>. 
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Table 2: Main Investments by GCC SWFs in Western Financial Institutions (2007-2008) 
Sovereign Wealth Fund Target of Investment Value in USD Billion 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority (ADIA) Citigroup 7.6 
Kuwait Investment Authority 
(KIA) Merrill Lynch 3.4 
Qatar Investment Authority London Stock Exchange 2.0 
Mubadala Development 
Company The Carlyle Group 1.35 
Dubai International Capital HSBC 1.0 
Qatar Investment Authority Credit Suisse .603 
Adapted from: Roland Beck & Michael Fidora, The Impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds on 
Global Financial Markets (Frankfurt: European Central Bank, 2008) 11.  & M. Asutay, GCC 
SWFs and Their Role in the European and American Markets (UK: Equilibri, 2008) 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: World Nominal Oil Price Chronology: 1970
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Annual Oil Market 
Information Administration, <http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/aomc/overview.html>.
23 April 2011. 
 
-2007 
 
Chronology," 2008, Energy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87
 Last Accessed: 
  
88
Summary of Capstone Project 
 As a double major in Economics and International Relations, oil has been 
of the most frequently discussed and reoccurring topics in my academic career.  
Specifically, most conversation revolved around petrodollars—the revenues 
generated from oil—and the degree to which they were being recycled efficiently.   
A general trend started to emerge in that regardless of how many times the subject 
of petrodollars was mentioned, the argument always took the same form: although 
a massive amount of revenue was generated for members of the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries during the 1973 oil boom, they were always 
channeled directly into the hands of the elite and resulted in widespread 
inequality, corruption and economic decay.  Up until my junior year I was 
satisfied and accepted this conclusion at face value.  However, three little words 
changed my entire perspective and became the subject of my Senior Capstone 
Project: Sovereign Wealth Funds. 
 I was first introduced to the concept of Sovereign Wealth Funds when I 
was given the largest SWF in the world, The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, as 
my client and asked to assess the degree to which the fund recycles petrodollars 
efficiently.  I was expecting to write the same traditional argument namely that as 
an extension of the government, the oil revenues channeled into SWFs like the 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, either ended up in the pockets of the fund’s 
leaders or wasted on lavish inefficient projects.  On the contrary, I was shocked to 
discover that the majority of oil revenues were actually being channeled through 
these so-called sovereign wealth funds into global financial markets.  This 
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discovery became the basic premise and topic of the first section of my Capstone: 
The traditional literature on oil-exporting nations failed to notice this phenomenon 
because they were limiting their perspective to the national and local level.  
Hence, the aim of my thesis was to examine how the discussion of oil-exporting 
country’s revenues changes once the scope is expanded to an international 
perspective.    
In order to assess the implications that arise from this shift in perspective, 
I separated my Capstone into five main sections.   As previously mentioned, the 
first section serves as a review of the traditional literature regarding oil-exporting 
nations.  It assesses the classic tale of oil-exporters and concludes with the 
introduction of a new actor for managing oil revenues: Sovereign Wealth Funds 
(SWFs).  Although the first SWF dates back to 1953, they remained relatively 
in the shadows until roughly ten years ago.  In fact, the term sovereign wealth 
fund itself was only coined recently in 2005.  Hence, since they are a relatively 
unknown concept, section two serves as a general introduction to sovereign 
wealth funds.   Generally speaking, sovereign wealth funds are the investment 
arms of governments charged with the responsibility of recycling wealth 
from commodity (oil) revenues by reinvesting it in international financial 
markets.   While there are many different types and variations of sovereign 
wealth funds, for the purpose of this study, I focused only on oil-based 
commodity funds located in the Middle East.   
To gain a better understanding of the nature of sovereign wealth 
funds, in section three I took a closer look at the three most prominent SWFs 
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in the Middle East in terms of their participation in global financial markets.  I 
discovered two trends after examining the history, mission statement and 
investment strategies of The Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA - the oldest 
SWF), The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA - the largest SWFs), and The 
Qatar Investment Authority (QIA - the new comer).   The first discovery was an 
increased appetite for risk on behalf of all three SWFs, with newer funds like QIA 
demonstrating more aggressive and progressive investment behavior than the 
more reserved and traditional funds like KIA.  Regardless of the type of 
investment strategy, what is evident is that both traditional and newer sovereign 
wealth funds have acquired a preference for high profile investments in major 
Western companies, especially financially troubled ones.    
Investments like ADIA’s 7.6 billion dollar investment in Citigroup and 
KIA’s 3.4 billion dollar investment in Merrill Lynch not only signified the 
successful evolution of sovereign wealth funds from relatively unknown entities 
to major players in the world of international finance, but they also ignited two 
heated debates.  The first is the topic of the fourth section of my Capstone and 
regards the potential impact of SWFs on global financial markets.  Specifically, 
do SWFs represent a stabilizing or destabilizing force on international financial 
markets?  On the one hand, SWFs were viewed as stabilizing forces on the market 
by providing much needed liquidity to failing Western financial institutions.  On 
the other hand, the very fact that they represent a foreign government conjured up 
xenophobic sentiments regarding the potential of hidden political motivations.   
  
91
The second debate and topic of the last section of my Capstone, considers 
what this emergence has meant for the domestic economies and home countries of 
sovereign wealth funds.  It is a return to the more traditional context by asking to 
what extent do the investments of sovereign wealth funds provide socio-economic 
benefits to their citizens?  The rise of SWFs along with the financial crisis of 
2008 led SWFs to restructure and reconsider the pressing needs of their 
domestic economies and citizens.   In terms of the older, more traditional 
sovereign wealth funds like ADIA, their role has remained unchanged: they were 
not established to perform direct local investment.  On the other hand, in response 
to an underdeveloped private sector, a rapidly growing national labor force and a 
high dependence on foreign labor, funds like KIA established a separate entity to 
promote the growth of emerging private enterprises while some like QIA opted to 
allocate a pre-existing section of the fund to carry out direct local investments.  
Lastly, since most traditional sovereign wealth funds were not designed nor 
intended to directly achieve socio-economic objectives, we have seen the 
development of a new kind of SWF created with the sole purpose of investing 
domestically.   
The expansion of the narrow traditional perspective to a new international 
one highlights a wide array of implications for both global financial markets and 
the home countries of sovereign wealth funds.  To commence, sovereign wealth 
funds represent a general shift in financial power away from the West and 
towards emerging markets.  While this trend has sparked fears and concerns 
regarding the potential political motivations of SWFs, their track record 
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demonstrates that these fears have been overstated.  While sovereign wealth funds 
should not be viewed in terms of villains or heroes, they should be taken seriously 
as major financial players.  Furthermore, it is also important to acknowledge the 
new found sense of sovereignty and bargaining power accompanying this position 
as well.  Lastly, when it comes to the potential role of sovereign wealth funds in 
economic development the answer is not as conclusive.  While the goal of my 
thesis was not to evaluate the effectiveness of SWFs as tools for economic 
development, I do want to highlight the potential for a new type of development 
strategy that is aligned with global financial markets.  All in all, while the impact 
of sovereign wealth funds on international financial markets and their domestic 
economies may continue to evolve, it is important to continue to evaluate SWFs 
in a realistic and pragmatic manner rather than fall victim to sensationalist claims.     
 
 
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
